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Substitution and price elasticities of fuel demand by 
electric utilities indicate that baseload fuels substitute 
for peakload fuels in the aggregated utility fuel market as 
a result of utilities* ability to buy and sell on the 
wholesale power market. This behavior reduces operating 
costs, and smooths aggregate demand curves without modifying 
consumer behavior.
This research develops a model of fuel demand by 
wholesale power customers to study substitution in utility 
fuels markets. Cross-elasticities were estimated using an 
econometric demand model of six utility fuel inputs solved 
by iterative seemingly ̂ un related regression. The data set 
is fuel demand and prices, wholesale power demand and 
prices, and electricity production by 82 privately owned 
electric utilities during 1987. In addition to wholesale 
power, fuel inputs include coal, natural gas, residual fuel 
oil, nuclear fuel, and hydroelectric power.
Results further indicate that these commodities are 
generally own-price sensitive and cross-price insensitive, 
but nonetheless, there are significant substitution dynamics 
to consider. Coal and wholesale power demand is the least 
sensitive to price of the six electric utility energy 
sources, while hydroelectric power, gas, oil and nuclear
iii
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fuel demand is several times more responsive to own-price 
variation.
The estimated cross-price elasticities indicate that 
wholesale power does not substitute significantly for 
primary fuels, but cross-price elasticities do provide 
evidence of substitutions between functionally incompatible 
fuels that could not be accomplished without wholesale power 
transactions. This feature is especially noticeable in the 
substitution between oil and nuclear fuel, which appear to 
be mutually elastic substitutes despite the lack of 
technical compatibility between prime movers. In addition 
to the association between nuclear fuel and fuel oil, other 
inter-technology fuel displacement occurs between gas and 
nuclear fuel, oil and hydroelectric power, and to a lesser 
degree, between coal and nuclear power. In summary, this 
interfuel substitution amounts to fuels that normally supply 
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Wholesale power trade between electric utilities is an 
important market mechanism permitting more efficient 
electric generation and higher system reliability. A 
question which concerns the utility industry’s traditional 
energy suppliers is: if wholesale trade increases, how will 
market shares of energy commodities be affected? As yet, 
there is no consensus about current interfuel substitution 
despite anecdotal evidence. In 1987, the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC) proposed expanded and less- 
regulated wholesale trade to provide incentive for private 
utilities to increase wholesale supply (FERC, 1987), an idea 
supported by recent research indicating that profit-based 
incentives will bring more wholesale power to market (Acton 
and Besen, 1987). Decreased market protection and mandated 
transmission access, it is argued, will establish a more 
competitive environment among electric utilities. A 
secondary effect of increased competition among utilities 
would be to realign the relative market shares now occupied 
by energy suppliers.
Fuel and energy expenses are the largest portion of 
utility operating costs and, including energy purchased in
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the form of wholesale power, form 60% of utility operating 
expense (EIA/DOE, 1989a). Fuel expenditure by utilities 
provide the largest revenue source to the coal and nuclear 
fuel industries. The prospect of increased wholesaling 
practice raises two questions for fuel suppliers: 1) What is 
interfuel substitution by electric utilities? and 2) What is 
the impact of wholesale power transactions on electric 
utility demand?
1.1 Problem Statement
This research proposes to measure wholesale power 
substitution for energy fuels by estimating substitution 
elasticities between fuels in the presence of wholesale 
power as an alternative energy source. Despite anecdotal 
evidence, past research regarding energy substitution has 
not established the direction nor magnitude of interfuel 
elasticity with wholesale power included as an energy 
source, nor measured the effect on energy markets. From the 
perspective of fuel suppliers, increased long-distance power 
transmission and proposals to deregulate historically 
protected utility franchises may further disrupt already 
depressed energy markets. The research here provides 
important information in this regard, particularly in the 
relative magnitude of fuel substitution.
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1.2 Approach
This research develops a model of conditional input 
demand by potential wholesale buyers to study substitution 
in the utility fuels markets. Interfuel relationships will 
be estimated by cross-elasticities, measured using an 
econometric demand model of six utility fuel inputs solved 
by iterative seemingly unrelated regression. The data set 
is fuel demand and prices, wholesale power demand and 
prices, and electricity production by 82 privately owned 
electric utilities during 1987. In addition to wholesale 
power, energy inputs include coal, natural gas, residual 
fuel oil, nuclear fuel, and hydroelectric power.
1.3 Summary
Results indicate that baseload fuels substitute for 
peakload fuels in the aggregated utility fuel market. This 
feature of utility demand permits important economies for 
utilities by effectively flattening demand curves. Although 
wholesale power does not displace fuel consumption, 
wholesale power transactions permit more interfuel 
substitution than would otherwise be possible.
Judging from own-price elasticities, coal and wholesale 
power demand is least price-sensitive of the six electric 
utility energy sources (own-price elasticities of -0.5 and
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-0.3 respectively), while hydroelectric power, gas, oil, and 
nuclear fuel demand is several times more responsive to 
price variation (own-price elasticities fall between -1.3 
and -2.5). Inelastic wholesale power demand might indicate 
a large number of requirements-type sales in the data set. 
Natural gas and oil elasticities agree with previous 
estimates showing utility demand for these fuels to be more 
sensitive to price changes than manufacturing sector energy 
demand.
Previous research has demonstrated interfuel 
substitution, mostly attributed to dual-fuel boiler 
technology, boilers which can switch immediately from one 
fuel to another. This study's cross-price elasticities 
indicate that market-wide substitution occurs between fuel 
pairs such as nuclear fuel and residual fuel oil, which 
cannot take place in generating units that use different 
technologies. In addition to the association between 
nuclear fuel and fuel oil, other intertechnology fuel 
displacement occurs between gas and nuclear fuel, oil and 
hydroelectric power, and to a lesser extent, between coal 
and nuclear fuel. Wholesale power substitution coincides 
with all three major intertechnology substitutions, 
substitution which could not occur without wholesale power 
transactions.
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Future research in fuel substitution may either 
increase the level of detail or expand the technique's scope 
and purpose. If time series were pooled with the existing 
cross-sectional format, regional demand effects could be 
interpreted. A refined version of this analysis could be 
included in a comprehensive, multiple-sector analysis of 
energy demand, or compared to utility markets simulated by 
dynamic-programming techniques to examine policy questions. 
The success of this study also suggests that the translog 







This chapter describes the electric utility industry 
demand markets, supply technology, cost structure, and 
wholesale markets. A description of supply and demand 
markets includes ownership and regulatory characteristics of 
electricity suppliers and the industry's technical 
structure. The discussion on market demand includes the 
electric power end-user market and the market for inter­
utility bulk power sales.
2.2 Electric Utility Industry Market Structure 
Electricity in the United States is supplied by four
major ownership groups, investor-owned utilities (IOUs), 
Federal Power Marketing Associations (PMAs), electric 
cooperatives, and publicly owned local systems: municipal, 
county, and state power authorities. IOUs form about 8% of 
total utilities by number, but supply 80% of generated 
electricity and sales to ultimate customers (Table 2.1). 
Cooperative, local, and state-owned utilities form over 90% 
of utility organizations while providing a minor portion of 
supply, about 13%, of generated power.
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IOUs 276 8.5 2,022.3 79 77
PM As 8 0.2 205.4 8 2
Rural Co-ops 961 29.7 258.3 10 7
Public/State 1,996 61.6 86.2 3 15
Total 3,241 100.0 2,572.2 100 100
N o t e : Percentage totals may not equal 100% due to
independent rounding.
Sources: Graves, Edward, 1988, Utilities-Electric. in 
Industry Surveys. Standard and Poor's, October 20, 1988.
EIA/DOE, 1989, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 
Financial Statistics of Selected Electric Utilities 1987. 
Government Printing Office, Washington D.C.
2.2.1 Investor-Owned Utilities
Investor-owned utilities are privately held, publicly 
traded corporations. Approximately 90% of all IOUs are 
vertically integrated companies which own or operate 
generation, transmission, and distribution facilities 
(EIA/DOE, 1989a). Most IOUs are independent; however joint 
ownership and cooperation is common. Several utilities may 
be owned by a single, large holding company, and also, 
individual plants are run under joint operating agreements
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in which a generation plant is operated by a single utility, 
though generated power from these facilities is allocated to 
each participant. Holding companies and operating 
agreements allow companies to coordinate demand and 
generation to take advantage of excess capacity within a 
transmission grid.
IOUs operate as franchised monopolies under provisions 
which vary from state to state. State-granted franchise is 
justified in legal code by the stated desire to avoid 
duplication, improve efficiency, and minimize service area 
disputes. Although franchises overlap in rare instances, 
generally, state statutes prohibit remote utilities from 
servicing customers within a local utility’s protected 
market. Franchise legislation is enacted in one of two 
forms: "territorial statutes," which define geographic 
service boundaries, and "certificates of public convenience 
and necessity." Both forms grant certification and assign a 
service area. Territorial statutes are used by 23 states, 
and 38 states grant certificates. In either case, 
competition from outside utilities is effectively prevented 
(Porter and Burton, 1989). In return for the privilege of 
protected franchises, utilities agree to serve all customers 
who desire service, and to adhere to state regulation 
enforced by state public utility commissions empowered with
T-4071 9
general operating supervision and rate regulation.
2.2.2 Publicly Owned Utilities
Government has been involved in electric utility 
ownership and operation since the late nineteenth century. 
Federally owned utilities are organized as PMA s , built and 
operated either by the Corps of Engineers or the Water and 
Power Resource Service. These PMAs are Bonneville, 
Southwestern, Southeastern, Alaskan, and Western Area. A 
sixth system is the Tennessee Valley Administration, the 
largest utility system in the country. Table 2.2 shows the 
relative size of the federal PMAs measured by annual sales 
and sales for resale (SFR), and indicates that for all but 
the Tennessee Valley Authority, the primary power source for 
federal PMAs is hydroelectric power.
The federal PMAs are a large source of hydroelectric 
power, and almost 80% of federal power is sold for resale to 
state, local, or small privately owned utilities. However, 
the Bonneville Power Marketing Administration, to cite an 
exception, sells directly to industrial customers, and the 
Tennessee Valley Administration sells directly to 
residential and commercial customers.
2.3 Regulation
The electric utility industry is regulated in terms of
T-4071 10
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Alaska Power 0.3 327.4 NA
Bonneville 68.9 46.4 NA
Southeastern 6.5 6.5 NA
Southwestern 5.8 5.8 NA
Western Area 40.9 34.2 NA
Tennessee Valley 
Administration 108.5 91.8 1,830
Total 231.1 185.1 1,830
N o t e : Gwh = gigawatt hour
Source: EIA/DOE, 1989, Financial Statistics of Selected
Electric Utilities 1987, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C.
market entry, consumer-price determination, and capacity 
investment decisions, as are other utilities: water, gas, 
railroads, and communications. Most regulated utilities are 
transmission industries, essentially engaged in commodity 
transportation businesses. Similarly, however, the power 
generation activity of utilities is regulated by government 
control over investment recovery. Government at all 
political levels has intervened in the electric utility 
market with regulated entry and cost devices, acting out of 
the belief that natural monopolies will inevitably develop
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and restrict service to charge higher prices. Several 
aspects of electric utility regulation impacts costs which 
may be passed along to customers— fuels consumed, and the 
prices paid or charged to other utilities for wholesale 
power. These regulatory policies can impact short- and 
long-term energy supply decisions.
Two views of regulated environments have evolved: 
first, that regulation is justified on empirical economies 
of scale exhibited by the transmission technologies and, 
second, that regulation serves mainly to protect the 
regulated industry. Superficially, both suggestions are 
compelling. In the case of electric utilities, transmission 
and generation units are both considered to have increasing 
economies of scale which excludes numerous small competitors 
forced to yield markets to a single large supplier. The 
regulator’s objective in market intervention is to simulate 
competitive market supply and pricing by ensuring cost 
recovery and competitive financial return and by regulating 
prices down to marginal producer cost.
Other authors argue that utilities benefit from 
regulation because they are essentially granted exclusive 
franchises, cost-plus pricing, and guaranteed rates of 
return (Moorehouse, 1986). From this perspective, 
regulation serves mainly to protect producers from self-
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destructive competition and a significant degree of business 
risk by avoiding circumstances where all suppliers incur 
redundant capital costs which could not be recovered by 
competitive (i.e., marginal cost) prices.
Historical capital costs allowed in the base rate are 
subject to regulatory approval, but, typically, the state 
allows the undepreciated portion of capital costs to be 
recovered in the rate charged to retail customers (EIA/DOE, 
1989b). Until the mid-1980s, electric utility management 
had grown accustomed to perfunctory rate and capacity 
request approvals, but recently, public utility commissions 
have denied rate requests on the basis of the prudence 
principal, using the rationale that a prudent utility 
operator will avoid unnecessary capacity investment 
(Pitrolo, 1986). Retail prices are determined by estimating 
future capital costs and variable costs (labor and fuel) 
over a specified time.
In the past, the FERC and Congress, via the Public 
Utilities Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA), required large 
utilities to purchase cogenerated power from nonutilities at 
the hypothetical cost a utility would pay if the necessary 
capacity had to be purchased or recruited. The PURPA was 
amended in 1987 to allow utilities to accept bids from the 
most efficient cogeneration suppliers. Before the 1987
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amendment, only qualifying suppliers could apply for 
cogeneration contracts with utilities, defined as sellers 
who owned no more than 80 megawatts production capacity. As 
amended, nonqualifying suppliers--inferring remote utilities 
with excess capacity--may bid to supply electricity to the 
local utility, a mechanism which should increase 
competition. Another legislative act which impacts utility 
regulation is the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act 
(PIFUA). This act effectively prohibited new gas-turbine 
capacity from 1977 to 1987, when the gas restrictions were 
repealed.
Industry observers interpret these recent amendments to 
PURPA and PIFUA as a signal of a relaxed regulatory 
environment, and by all accounts an even less regulated era 
is imminent, although total deregulation is unlikely. There 
is uncertainty on all sides of the regulation issue about 
what the proper degree of regulation should be when a post- 
restriction regulation philosophy is developed by the FERC. 
One set of proposals centers on making the existing 
transmission grid available to increased wholesale power 
transactions (Graves, 1988). Energy producers will be 
impacted to some degree if wholesale power becomes available 
to more buyers, though there is no consensus on these 
effects.
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2.4 Electricity Markets and Demand Characteristics
A description of electricity markets and their demand 
characteristics is necessary for an understanding of the 
technological capabilities required by utilities to supply 
electricity to a broad set of customers most efficiently. 
This chapter briefly outlines demand markets and their 
demand patterns and characteristics (and limitations) of the 
technology intended to meet this demand.
2.4.1 Consumer Demand Patterns
During 1987, total electrical power demand in the 
United States was approximately 2.5 billion kilowatt hours 
(kwh), the equivalent of 7.9 quadrillion British thermal 
units (Btu). (One quadrillion Btu is referred to as one 
quad.) This electricity generation is about 11% of total 
U.S. energy demand by ultimate users (EIA/DOE, 1988a). 
Electricity demand markets are broken down by major 
submarkets: residential, commercial, and industrial 
customers. Residential customers are households and 
institutions that use electricity for heat, lighting, and 
home appliance operation. Commercial customers are 
primarily consumers in the service sector who use electric 
power to light, heat, and air condition office buildings, 
hospitals, warehouses, and garages. The industrial sector
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is less homogeneous; it includes nondurable good producers 
(food, textiles, publishing, petroleum products, paper, and 
chemicals) and durable goods (machine tooling, electronics, 
transportation, and metals extraction).
Among the three sectors, relative market size has 
realigned itself. Historically, industrial customers were 
the largest electric utility end market, but in 1986, 
residential demand exceeded industrial consumption for the 
first time. Commercial markets have grown rapidly as well: 
both sectors grew between 6% and 10% annually from the early 
1970s to the early 1980s, although recently growth has 
slowed. In 1978, industrial demand was 40% of total demand, 
commercial demand was 23%, and residential demand was 33%.
By 1987, the industrial sector was down to 34.5% of total 
demand, commercial customers consumed 27%, and at 35.6% of 
total demand, residential consumption was the largest 
electricity market (EIA/DOE, 1988a).
2.4.2 Consumption Characteristics
A unique characteristic of electricity consumption is 
that customers expect their incremental demand will be 
instantly satisfied. Instantaneous demand has several 
implications for utilities, whose residential and commercial 
customers are accustomed to flexible service and unlimited
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consumption. Electric power expenditure is about 2% of 
residential and commercial income, and since electric power 
expenditure is not perceived as a major cost, additional 
demand for power is made without regard to additional 
expense (Bureau of the Census, 1989).
Amplifying the effect of instantaneous demand is the 
timing of peak demand, which influences important utility 
decisions concerning the type of capacity to acquire. 
Residential and commercial customers use power for similar 
applications, and power demand from both groups is related 
to workday activities. During the summer, commercial and 
residential air conditioning creates a single large demand 
peak from about 8:00 AM to 10:00 PM of from 50% to 60% above 
base demand. During winter, utilities in cold climates 
observe two peak periods, late morning and after sundown. 
Figure 2.1 shows a generic daily load demand profile.
Patrick (1986) details load characteristics and different 
generation costs in various portions of this demand curve.
A consequence of erratic demand patterns is the need 
for utilities to acquire specialized capacity during peak 
demand. To meet demand fluctuations most economically, 
utilities invest in a mixture of high-cost, reserve- 
generating capacity on hand that is under used for much of 
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Figure 2.1 Typical Diurnal Demand Patterns
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cost of this capacity is included in the capital base used 
for calculating customer rates, electricity prices to 
customers are necessarily higher by this amount.
Besides the capacity necessary to meet retail demand, 
utilities maintain excess capacity, referred to as margin 
reserve, to buffer sudden demand surges or to respond to 
generation or transmission failures without service 
disruption. Margins typically range between 15% and 25% of 
baseload capacity, but individual utilities may own a much 
higher fraction of excess capacity (Bureau of Census, 1989) 
unnecessary for meeting their local demand alone.
Industrial customers, whose electric expenditure is 
large enough to be economically managed and have more 
predictable usage patterns, demand large volumes at constant 
rates. Recent history has shown that as industrial 
customers leave the system, a growing majority of a 
utility's base comes from peak-demand customers: businesses 
and households. The implication for the industry is that 
demand peaks increase as consumption by commercial and 
residential sectors rise, but baseload requirements decrease 
as industrial demand decreases. This results in a steeper 
demand curve with correspondingly less efficient capacity 
utilization and higher generation costs. The electric 
utility industry is investigating pricing mechanisms
T-4071 19
intended to flatten demand curves and increase system 
efficiency by modifying consumer demand behavior, including 
time-of-use pricing and demand charges (Moore, 1986).
2.5 Electric Power Production Technology
Consumption characteristics influence the technologies 
chosen to supply demand, a selection based on the operating 
costs of different primary power sources as supplying 
utilities attempt to meet demand at minimum cost. This 
section will describe how certain generating units are 
better suited for different demand characteristics and how 
this preference is related to operating costs.
2.5.1 Electric Utility Capacity
A simple electric generation and distribution system is 
a prime mover (a heat or energy source) unit driving an 
electric generator, connected to a transmission line and an 
electric load. Power generation units are combined into 
plants where multiple units are connected in parallel to 
allow for planned maintenance or to serve as backup for 
unexpected outages.
Generating units have an maximum limit on production 
rate measured in megawatts, referred to as the un i t ’s 
capacity. Energy capacity is the energy delivered over a 
given time. If a 1,000 watt generator ran for 24 hours
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continuously, it would produce 24,000 watt-hours or 24 kwh 
of energy. Typically, however, only baseload generators, 
such as coal, nuclear, and hydroelectric plants run for over 
24 hours at a time. All plants have scheduled down-time, 
and generators often operate at partial output. The 
percentage of total electric capacity (the energy a 
generating unit would produce if operated at 100% capacity 
for 24 hours a day) a generator actually produces in one 
year is called the load factor. Steep, highly fluctuating 
demand curves contribute to low load factors.
In a simplified view, there are four functional types 
of generating capacity (after Elgerd, 1982):
1. Baseload units. Baseload is the demand level below 
which demand never falls. Coal and nuclear units 
are most efficiently used for stable demand 
patterns in order for them to maintain their 
thermal balance, so in practice, these prime movers 
supply the bulk of baseload power.
2. Intermediate units. Intermediate units must have 
controllable output. Hydroelectric plants are the 
most convenient to use when output must be 
regulated because they are easily adjusted by 
controlling water flow. Thermal units, coal and 
oil, are used when hydroelectric power is not
T-4071 21
available; however, thermal unit response time is 
limited by a given plant’s load rate, the megawatts 
per minute which output may increase safely.
3. Peaking units. Gas-turbine generators have high 
load rates, short response times, can pick up load 
quickly and therefore are often used for peaking 
purposes when system demand rises suddenly.
4. Reserve units. A system’s resiliency to unexpected 
outages depends upon available reserves, or margin 
capacity. Margin capacity can consist of 
generators maintained at partial output or as 
generators standing by at various levels of 
readiness.
In practice, the cheapest generation resource is 
recruited first, and when that resource is exhausted, the 
next cheapest resource is fired and enters the system, and 
so on. Once demand has peaked and begins to decline, 
operators remove generators from the system in reverse 
order. The effect is to keep the most expensive generators 
operating for the minimum amount of time. Hydroelectric 
power is used both as a baseload and peakload source, coal 
and nuclear plants are used to maintain baseload and margin, 
and oil, gas, and internal combustion generators supply 
peak-demand. Table 2.3 displays estimated summer
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Coal 292.6 43 1,464 57
Gas 118.2 18 273 11
Oil 76.1 11 118 4
Nuclear 93.6 14 455 18
Hydroelectric 89.6 14 249 10
Total 674.1 100 2,572 100
N o t e : Based on average all for all power plants
Source: EIA/DOE, 1988, Electric Power Annual 1987, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.
generating capacity by prime mover for the United States in
1986. From the generation figures in the table, it is seen 
that baseload units, (coal, nuclear, and to a certain 
extent, hydroelectric) form about 70% of installed capacity 
and supply about 85% of generation.
2.5.2 Cost Structure
Economically, the electric utility industry can be 
broken down into the three major activities: generation, 
transmission, and distribution. Generation is the 
conversion of mechanical energy into electric energy, 
transmission is long distance power delivery over high
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voltage power lines, and distribution includes services to 
commercial and residential customers: installation,
administration, bill collection, and low-voltage substation 
maintenance.
The operating cost structure is dominated by fuel costs 
and purchased power, which together account for about 58% of 
operating expenses. Composite operating expenses for the 
186 private utilities reported in the 1987 Financial 
Statistics of Selected Electric Utilities (FSSEU) is given 
as evidence, shown in Table 2.4. In the table, fuel costs 
include fossil and nuclear fuel costs and water purchased 
for hydroelectric power generation. Purchased power is 
predominantly wholesale power purchases, but may include 
transmission interchanges.
Fuel cost and purchased power are the expenses most 
directly associated with generation costs. Operations 
and maintenance costs in fact represent labor expenditure; 
engineering and supervision and technician labor, activities 
which vary little as electricity output increases. As 
shown, transmission and distribution expenses were 
relatively minor costs, distribution expense was about 6% of 
total expense, and transmission expense was about 2%.
Generation cost reported by the EIA/DOE in Historical 
Plant Operating Costs for Selected Utilities (EIA/DOE,
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Table 2.4 Private Utility Expenses 1987
Cost Element (87 B$) (%)
Fuel 31.0 39.3
Purchased Power 14.7 18.6







Source: EIA/DOE, 1989, Financial Statistics of 
Selected Electric Utilities 1987, U.S. Government 
Printing Office, Washington D.C.
1989b) is broken down into operation and maintenance cost, 
fuel cost, and capital charges. Operation and maintenance 
costs are recurring expenses to operate generation plants 
and maintain the generating and transmission facilities.
This category includes operator’s wages and benefits, plant 
maintenance, security, supervision, materials, spares, and 
consumables other than fuel. Combined generating costs for 
the five major prime movers are shown in Table 2.5.
Capital charge is the historical book value of the 
utility’s physical plant, distributed across the electricity 
produced by the utility. Utilities recover capital charge
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Table 2.5 Production Costs by Prime Mover 
(1987 mills per kilowatt hour)
Cost Element Hydro Coal Oil Nuclear Gas
Operations 1.30 1.53 1.36 8.21 5.03
Maintenance 1.05 2.55 2.43 5.07 9.46
Fuel Costs na 16.86 25.78 7.69 32.71
Total 2.35 20.94 29.57 20.97 47.19
Source: EIA/DOE, 1989, Historical Plant Cost and Annual
Production Expenses for Selected Electric Plants 1987 »
Government Printing Office, Washington D.C.
only during plant operation, consequently; capital charges 
are inversely proportional to load factor (i.e., low load 
factors imply high capital charge per kwh). Since capital 
charges are actually a regulatory mechanism for recovering 
fixed costs which are invariant with electric power output, 
capital charge has been omitted from the generation costs 
shown in Table 2.5.
As shown in Table 2.5, except for nuclear fuel 
generation, operating and maintenance costs are a minority 
fraction of generation cost. Oil and gas-turbine plants 
have higher maintenance costs per kwh, in part because load 
factor from these plants is comparatively low.
Along with all other consumers and producers, utilities
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endured volatile fuel costs between 1978 and 1987, shown in 
Table 2.6. Oil prices peaked in 1981, gas in 1982, and coal 
in 1984. However, by the beginning of 1987, oil and gas 
prices had declined 51% and 35% from their respective 
historical highs. Beginning in 1979, oil price controls 
were gradually removed (Ikenberry, 1988) and most natural 
gas was deregulated by 1987 (Mattke, 1988).
Transmission costs are a small portion of operating 
costs (about 2%), but transmission facility construction 
requires significant investment by utilities when connection 
to new markets or customers is desired. Most transmission 
lines are three-phase bare conductors on aerial transmission 
towers insulated by surrounding air; tower construction and 
conductor costs dominate transmission line investment.
During 1987, the average cost per mile of installed 
transmission line, including underground lines, was 
approximately $240,000 (EIA/DOE, 1989a), but high-voltage 
lines can cost up to $750,000 per mile (Moore, 1986). Where 
population density is high, environmental concern stemming 
from high-voltage induced electromagnetic fields introduces 
legal and financial obstacles for utilities attempting to 
secure right of way. Public utility commissions, responding 
to public concern over environmental hazards and aesthetic 
considerations, permit fewer plants and transmission tower
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Table 2.6 Fuel Cost Trends
Year Coal Oil Gas
1986 1.63 2.47 2.41
1985 1.70 2.31 3.53
1984 1.72 4.95 3.69
1983 1.71 4.72 3.57
1982 1.70 4.97 3.48
1981 1.58 5.49 2.89
1980 1.39 4.40 2.27
1979 1.26 3.08 1.80
1978 1. 15 2.19 1.46
Percent Change
From 1978 +4.0 + 1.4 + 5.7
From Peak -5.0 -51.1 -35.0
Source: EIA/DOE, Annual Energy Review, 1987 and 
years previous, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington D.C.
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construction near population centers, and as a result, newer 
plants are located nearer to mine sites and tend to transmit 
power over longer distances than older plants.
2.6 Wholesale Power
This section describes the wholesale electric power 
market, market institutions and supply characteristics, and 
how information about fuel prices enters decisions to buy 
either fuel or wholesale power. Based on the information 
presented in this section, a model is developed for 
wholesale transactions, for later use in regression 
analysis.
2.6.1 Market Characteristics
In 1987, private electric utilities, a minor fraction 
of the 3,200 utilities operating in the United States, 
produced 40% of all electricity sales for resale (EIA/DOE, 
1989a). Sales for resale include two major categories, 
requirements sales and coordination sales. Many smaller 
municipal and state-owned utilities are strictly 
distribution companies that own no generation capacity and 
rely upon nearby private utilities or federal PMAs to supply 
power. Sales to these companies are known as requirements 
sales. Larger municipalities and cooperatives sometimes own 
enough capacity to supply a portion of their retail demand,
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but satisfy the rest of their demand with wholesale power 
from either IOUs or federal PMAs. These customers are known 
as partial requirements customers. Typically, requirements 
and partial requirements sales are for noninterruptable 
power on a long-term basis.
Many requirements customers are located inside a larger 
utility’s franchised operating area. Because they are 
connected to the larger utility’s distribution system, small 
utilities are often isolated from other utilities in terms 
of transmission access, and therefore have a single 
potential partner from whom to purchase wholesale power. In 
such an instance, the FERC exercises price-setting controls 
to avoid negotiating imbalances. The price-setting process 
in requirements markets is similar to the rate-setting 
process for retail customers (Acton and Besen, 1985b).
Once retail requirements are met, system operating 
efficiency can be improved through coordination sales. 
Coordination is the practice of establishing common 
operating procedures, planning and sharing reserve capacity, 
collectively planning new capacity, coordinating operating 
procedures to improve efficiency and reliability, and 
minimizing costs subject to reliability, capacity, and 
demand constraints (FERC, 1981). Usually, coordination 
activity refers to a system of several independent utilities
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who have agreed upon operating principles and have 
interconnected transmission facilities. Coordination sales 
refer to wholesale power sales which displace high-cost 
generating capacity while allowing involved parties to meet 
retail demand (FERC 1981).
The FERC recognizes several categories of coordinated 
transactions, distinguished from one another by the relative 
assurance that power involved in the sale will not be 
interrupted: firm service, conditionally interruptable 
service, and unconditionally interruptable service. Firm 
service implies that the seller commits the capacity 
supplying the power in the sale as well as backup reserves. 
Conditionally interruptable service places conditions under 
which service may be interrupted and implies a degree of 
commitment upon capacity, but not reserves. The most 
important type of transaction to this research is economy 
interchange, a category of unconditionally interruptable 
service which implies no capacity commitment, making the 
buyer responsible for providing reliability reserves. (Moss, 
1989).
Economy interchange prices and quantities purchased are 
not required by the FERC Form 1 report; however, sales for 
resale are reported. Private utilities sold 337 gigawatt 
hours (Gwh) for resale, and federal PMAs sold another 185
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Gwh resulting in total sales for resale of 522 Gwh in 1987, 
making wholesale power sales equal to about 21% of 
electricity consumption (EIA/DOE, 1989a).
This figure does not give a direct measure of the 
magnitude of economy interchange; however, it may be 
estimated as a fraction of sales for resale sold by the 82 
utilities researched for this study. Private utilities 
report their sales for resale on Page 310 of Form 1, 
separating sales to other nonassociated utilities (utilities 
with their own generating capacity) from sales to 
requirements customers (municipalities and associated 
utilities). Since economy interchange is a sale without 
claim on reserves to a utility which owns generating 
capacity, a portion of these sales to nonassociated 
utilities is economy interchange. An upper bound for 
economy interchange volume can be estimated by measuring the 
ratio of sales to nonassociated utilities to total sales for 
resale. As shown in Table 2.7, of the 140 Gwh sold for 
resale by the IOUs in the data set used for this research, 
104 Gwh were sold to other utilities, or about 76% of all 
sales for resale in the data set.
If this ratio of nonassociated sales to requirements 
customers holds for the entire 337 Gwh sold for resale by 
the 276 utilities reported in FSSEU, 254 Gwh of electric
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Table 2.7 Economy Interchange and Sales For Resale
Category Sales 
(Megawatt hours)
Thesis Data Set Sales For Resale 
Thesis Data Set Interutility Sales 
Fraction 





Total Interutility Sales (0.76 X SFR) 255,000,000
Fraction of Sales to 
Ultimate Customers 10.4%
Source: EIA/DOE, Financial Statistics of Selected Electric 
Utilities 1987, 1989, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C.
power was sold as either economy interchange or firm power, 
about 10% of all electricity consumed by ultimate consumers.
2.6.2 System Cost and Pricing Mechanisms
The decision to make an economy interchange purchase is 
based upon the difference between a buyer*s projected 
decremental cost and all potential sellers* incremental 
costs. Decremental cost is the reduction in total variable 
cost divided by the reduction in output for a given 
generation decrease. Incremental cost is the increase in 
total variable cost divided by the increase in output for a
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given generation increase. If utility A can supply its 
retail demand with power purchased from B at a price below 
the cost of capacity A will temporarily withdraw from 
service, system efficiency increases. Whether the gains are 
realized by the two utilities’ shareholders or retail 
customers is an issue which may be resolved by altering FERC 
regulating policy (Acton and Besen, 1985b).
Incremental costs increase as relative output (measured 
in percentage of name-plate capacity) increases. Since 
prime mover/turbine/generator assemblies are designed to 
work at 100% output, average cost is lowest at 100% output, 
but incremental cost is at a maximum. System cost is 
minimized at the point where the incremental cost for all 
units in the system are equal (FERC 1981). Baseload units, 
coal and nuclear, usually have the lowest incremental costs 
at all levels of relative output, so they are likely to be 
operated at nearly 100% capacity. At minimum system cost, 
oil-fired intermediate and gas-fired peaking units operate 
at output levels where their incremental cost is no higher 
than the incremental cost of any generator not already 
loaded. A cost-minimizing utility, after examining the 
loading of its current capacity and finding less expensive 
power on the wholesale spot market, will elect to substitute 
self-generation with wholesale power.
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In this market, exchanges are usually made for one 
hour. Each hour, utilities communicate with one another and 
post projected incremental and decremental costs for the 
next hour. In a simple bilateral transaction for example, 
if cost differences justify a 100 Mw transaction between two 
utilities, the switch is scheduled for the next hour. 
Beginning at 5 minutes before the hour until 5 minutes 
after, the seller increases its generation by a constant 
rate and the buyer decreases its generation by the same 
amount. The seller’s increased production continues for the 
remaining 50 minutes. Spot market sales are typical peak- 
demand transactions, but transactions up to weeks in 
duration may displace the purchaser’s less efficient 
baseload capacity (FERC, 1981).
The fuel source providing the seller’s power sold in 
this transaction is, in effect, substituting for the fuel 
which would otherwise power the buyer’s displaced 
generation. Accepting temporarily the premise that baseload 
capacity for private utilities is likely to be nuclear- or 
coal- powered and intermediate and peaking units are 
typically oil- or gas-fired, in this example, the load on 
the nuclear or coal unit increases, increasing fuel 
consumption for the sale duration, while fuel consumption 
for the displaced unit is temporarily suspended. The effect
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of repeated sales on the buyer’s energy account will reduce 
apparent year-end consumption of fuels supplying displaced 
capacity while increasing relative expenditure on wholesale 
power, and the effect on the seller will be to increase 
consumption in fuels supplying baseload capacity.
As mentioned earlier, municipalities, cooperatives, or 
other utilities whose primary service is distribution, may 
depend upon a single generating utility for all or a portion 
of their supply capacity. The FERC regulates wholesale 
prices paid to IOUs, and excepting recent experiments, 
generally allows one of two pricing formulas: a straight 
percentage "adder," either in terms of mills per kwh or a 
percentage that is added to the seller’s incremental cost, 
or a "split savings" format where the selling utility 
receives 50% of the cost differential as profit and the 
buying utility saves 50% of its cost over the seller’s. The 
FERC has also approved split-the-savings formulas where 
profit was greater than savings (Acton and Besen, 1985a).
The simple bilateral example described earlier may be 
complicated by the effect of loop flows on nearby utilities. 
Transmission flows do not generally flow direct from seller 
to buyer, but divide along multiple parallel paths, each 
having different carrying capacities in quantities 
proportional to the impedance of each individual path
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(Moore, 1986). For example, Canadian power sales to the 
Northeast may flow through Midwestern systems, displacing 
Midwestern transmission capability. Inadvertent loop flow 
through noninvolved utilities creates operating and 
opportunity costs for those utilities. In 1988, the FERC 
ruled that nonparticipating utilities may be compensated for 
loop flow loss and that compensation may allow recovery of 
increased fuel costs, forgone trade opportunities, reduced 
wheeling capacity, and ability to respond to emergencies. 
Loop flow costs are over and above the selling price, and 
accrue to third-party utilities (Rosso, 1989).
2.6.3 Market Institutions
The time and effort to locate trading partners may 
inhibit some wholesale power sales if the cost difference 
between seller and buyer is small. The industry has 
developed public and private institutions to streamline the 
search for trading partners and reduce search costs. The 
level of organization depends in part on management control 
retained by utilities.
Transmission systems in North America are organized 
into four networks: the Hydro-Quebec System, and the 
Eastern, Texas, and Western Interconnection Systems.
Networks are further broken down into control areas which
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control generation and transmission flows. Each control 
area has a dispatch center to monitor system generation 
output, frequency, and power flows in and out of the control 
area. The dispatch center may also monitor generation and 
purchases within the control area in an attempt to minimize 
system electric generation costs (FERC, 1981).
Power pooling is another mechanism to increase the 
level of transmission and generation coordination between 
utilities below the control area level. Formal pools are 
established by contractual agreement to establish 
management, planning, and operating criteria, sometimes 
enforced by penalties for noncompliance. Informal pools 
agree to establish common operating principles, review power 
supply problems and establish criteria for power supply 
adequacy, but compliance is voluntary. Pooling makes 
economy exchange easier and lowers search costs for parties 
interested in wholesale power trade (FERC, 1981).
Another method which achieves some coordination 
benefits and reduces search costs is energy brokering, as 
implemented by Florida utilities in the early 1980s. A 
computerized system pairs the lowest incremental cost seller 
(including transmission costs) with the highest decremental 
cost buyer, then the next lowest cost seller with the next 
highest cost buyer, and so on. Brokering systems differ
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from pooling arrangements in that brokered trades are 
bilateral agreements giving managers the option to decline a 
trade, while pooling arrangements are multi-lateral trades 
allowing managers less control. Loss of control has 
possibly been responsible for a decline in the number of 
utilities participating in pools and the fraction of U.S. 
generating capacity represented by utilities in pools (FERC, 
1981).
2.6.4 An Analytical Model
The familiar criteria for efficient markets invariably 
demands a market populated by many well-informed buyers and 
sellers, none of whom retain enough market share to 
influence prices by their independent choice to curtail 
either purchases or production. Producers do not collude 
either explicitly or tacitly, and exit and entry from the 
market sets equilibrium price equal to the marginal 
supplier’s production costs.
Superficially, the wholesale power market seems to 
diverge from this paradigm. Information flows are the least 
problematic, because there appear to be several mechanisms 
for communicating costs. FERC control over pricing may 
itself serve as evidence that competitive pricing will be 
inhibited by market power, but does not preclude the
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possibility that bilateral monopolies could develop which 
favor neither buyer or seller, permitting a competitive 
price equilibrium to be achieved without numerous firms or 
small market share (Acton and Besen, 1985b).
Considering the FERC treatment of price differentials 
and loop flow externalities, wholesale pricing would not 
seem to signal marginal costs of marginal suppliers.
However, if in fact the pricing formulas now administered 
impose artificial ceilings (for instance, in the split-the- 
savings rule), the price treatment may have no effect on the 
supply of wholesale power. Acton and Besen (1985b) state 
that price ceilings above marginal cost will have no effect 
on supply.
Despite the unique aspects of wholesale power markets, 
there appears to be no conclusive evidence suggesting that 
wholesale power quantity demanded could not be treated as a 
quantity demanded by cost-minimizing behavior, nor that 
price should not be treated as a market-determined exogenous 




U.S. DEMAND FOR ENERGY COMMODITIES 
AND ELECTRIC UTILITY DEMAND FOR ENERGY
3.1 U.S. Energy Overview
In 1987, the domestic sources supplied 64.5 quadrillion 
Btu, about 85% of the total U.S. consumption of 76.0 
quadrillion Btu. The remainder was imported, mainly as 
petroleum. Relative energy supply has shifted since 1970 
when the largest energy source was domestic oil and gas 
production; by 1987, coal had become the largest domestic 
energy source. On the demand side of energy markets, gas 
and coal demand was 23% and 24% of total consumption, 
respectively (EIA/DOE, 1988a).
3.2 Electric Utility Energy Demand
The electric utility industry produced 2,560,000 Gwh in 
1987 from 27.4 quadrillion Btu of energy (about 36% of 
overall demand). These figures imply that, overall, 
utilities operated at about 32% efficiency, meaning less 
than one-third of the heat content in the fuel was 
translated into electric power, the rest was mechanical 
loss. Efficiency declined a small amount between 1970 and
1987.
Table 3.1 shows electric utility energy consumption of
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Table 3.1 Utility Fuel Consumption, 1970 and 1987 
(quadrillion Btu)
1970 % 1987 %
%
Change
Coal 7.2 44 15.2 56 52
Gas 4.1 25 2.9 11 -37
Oil 2.1 13 1.3 5 -SB
Nuclear 0.2 2 4.9 18 95
Other 2.7 16 3.0 11 13
Total 16.3 100 27.4 100 40
(% of U.S. Energy) 24.5 36.0
Source: EIA/DOE, 1988, Annual Energy Review 1987. U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington D.C.
coal, natural gas, oil, and nuclear fuel in the years 1970 
and 1987. Table 3.2 shows energy production by fuel 
sources. During this period, nuclear fuel moved from the 
fourth-largest to the second-largest electric utility energy 
source, followed by gas and oil respectively. In general, 
power production by nuclear fuel and coal increased to the 
exclusion of oil and gas. Uranium oxide market share 
increased tenfold, coal share increased 25%, while oil and 
gas market share both fell dramatically.
From the perspective of coal suppliers, their demand 
markets became more concentrated in the utility industry,
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Table 3.2 Utility Energy Production by 
1970 and 1987 (billion kwh)
Fuel Source,
1970 % 1987 %
%
Change
Coal 704 46 1*,464 57 52
Gas 373 24 273 11 -37
Oil 184 12 118 5 -56
Nuclear 22 1 455 18 95
Hydro and other 248 16 250 10 1
Total 1,531 100 2,560 100 40
Source: EIA/DOE, 1988, Annual Energy Review 1987,
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington D.C.
while gas and oil exited the market. Electric utility 
demand for coal, oil, and gas as a fraction of total U.S. 
demand for each commodity by electric utilities in 1970 and 
1987 is shown in Table 3.3. Over the period shown, coal 
consumption increased 124%, gas consumption decreased 28%
(in part as a result of both increased price and regulatory 
restrictions). However, overall gas consumption was down, 
and decreased utility demand merely mirrored reduced overall 
gas demand, so gas concentration in electric utility markets 
fell only 9% relative to total U.S. consumption. Overall, 
U.S. oil consumption was up 17% over the period; utilities, 
however, cut demand by one-half.
In 1987, electric utilities spent $154 million on
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1970 Coal (tons) 320.2 523.2 61.2
Gas (Tcf) 3.9 21. 1 18.6
Oil (bbls) 338.7 5,365.5 6.3
Nuclear (lbs U 3 0 8 ) NA 21.6 NA
1987 Coal (tons) 718.0 917.0 78.3
Gas (Tcf) 2.8 16.7 17.0
Oil (bbls) 201 .4 6,267.0 3.2
Nuclear (lbs U 3 0 8 ) NA 25.3 NA
% Change Coal (%) 124 75 + 28
Gas (%) - 28 - 21 -9
Oil (%) - 41 17 - 49
Nuclear (%) NA 17 NA
Source: EIA/DOE, 1988, Annual Energy Review 1987. U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.
energy expenses. Of that amount, coal sales to the electric 
utility fuel market formed about two-thirds of the $37 
billion electricity fuel market; gas sales were about one- 
fifth of the electric utility market, shown broken down by 
fuel type in Table 3.4. Combined petroleum product sales, 
including heavy and light oils and petroleum coke, were 10% 
of total utility energy expenditures.
Expenditure is linked to consumption through price, and 
in 1987, demand was not supporting high prices. Composite 
U.S. energy prices in 1970, 1986, and 1987 are shown in
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Table 3.4 Electric Utility Energy Expenditures, 1970 
and 1987 (in 1987 million dollars)
Fuel 1970 % 1987 %
Coal $6,252 52 $22,785 62
Gas 3,217 27 6,561 18
Oil Products
Heavy Oil 2,228 18 3,439 9
Light Oil 224 2 362 1
Petroleum Coke 17 0 11 0
Oil Subtotal 2,465 20 3,812 10
Nuclear Fuel 123 1 3,486 10
Other 6 0 14 0
Total $12,063 $36,658
Note: Heavy oil includes Grade Numbers 4, 5, 6, and 
residual fuel oils. Light oil includes Grade Number 2 
heating oil, kerosene, and jet fuel.
Source: EIA/DOE, 1989, State Energy Price and 
Expenditure Report 1987, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C.
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Table 3.5 U.S. Composite Energy Prices, 1970, 1986 , and
1987 (in 1987 dollars/million B t u )
70-87 86-87
1970 1986 1987 % Chg % Chg
Electricity 13.96 19.57 18.71 34.01 -4.4
Coal 1.04 1.67 1.54 48.76 -7.7
Gas 1.65 4.19 4.07 146.55 -2.9
Oil 4.78 5.90 5.73 19.76 -2.9
Nuclear 0.45 0.72 0.70 56.36 -2.9
U. S. Average 4.62 7.56 7.38 59.86 -2.4
Source: EIA/DOE, 1989, State Energy Price and Expenditure
Report 1987, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 
D.C.
Table 3.5. Between 1970 and 1987, electricity was by far 
the most expensive energy source, followed by composite 
petroleum products and gas, respectively. Nuclear fuel 
price is represented by prices paid for the enriched uranium 
heptoxide. Natural gas price rose the fastest over the 
period, partially a result of deregulation. All energy 
prices fell during 1987, reflecting soft energy markets.
There are substantial differences in energy prices paid 
by different sectors, shown in Table 3.6. Electric 
utilities paid less than 50% of the national average price 
for energy commodities, in part because utilities consume a 
higher percentage of relatively cheap coal than other
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sectors. Residential consumers paid the highest prices for 
energy followed by commercial and transportation customers. 
Over the long term, prices rose fastest among industrial and 
commercial customers, but in 1987, prices to all consumers 
other than transportation fell.
Table 3.6 Fuel Price to Economic Sectors, 1970, 1986, & 






Electric Utils 0.90 1.60 1.51 69 -5.4
Residential 5.93 11.29 10.90 84 -3.4
Commercial 5.51 11.68 11.17 103 -4.3
Industrial 2.32 5.48 5.12 120 -6.5
Transportation 6.49 6.44 6.60 2 2.5
U. S. Average 3.02 4.09 3.97 31 -2.9
Source: EIA/DOE, 1989, State Energy Price and Expenditure 
Report 1987, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 
D.C.
3.3 Regional Fuel Demand by Electric Utilities
This research recognizes regional distinctions in 
energy production, consumption, and attempts to explain 
regional preference by including regional variables in the 
utility*s cost-minimization problem. For this purpose, 
states have been delineated into groups which roughly
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approximate geologic and geographic provinces, shown in 
Figure 3.1. These regions are referred to as North 
Atlantic, South Atlantic, Midwest, Northwest Central, 
Southwest Central, Mountain, and Pacific. The states which 
compose these regions, and the energy consumption for each 
state and region by energy type, are shown in Table 3.7. 
These regions are distinguished by the respective presence 
or absence of energy production capability, shown in Table 
3.8.
The regions with the largest coal endowment, indicated 
by recent production figures, are the Midwest and Mountain 
states, and most oil and gas production comes from the 
Southwest Central and Pacific regions. The North and South 
Atlantic regions possess negligible fuel production 
capacity. Accordingly, in energy-deficient regions, fuels 
most cheaply transported are the most intensely consumed. 
National consumption patterns are presented in Table 3.9, 
showing that in 1987, nuclear fuel and petroleum products 
were consumed in proportionately higher quantities in the 
North and South Atlantic states, regions where nearly all 
fuel must be imported.
Transportation cost is a smaller component of nuclear 
fuel and oil cost per Btu compared to coal or gas; 










Figure 3.1 Translog Model Geographic Regions
T-4071 49
Table 3.7 Regional Energy Provinces and Production
(in teraBtus)
Region Coal Gas Oil U308 Hydro
1 N. Atlantic 563 1,559 4,759 813 627
CT 21 95 452 223 9
ME 7 3 217 44 66
MA 118 233 829 12 53
NH 32 12 157 0 22
NJ 91 432 1,266 247 (3)
NY 294 779 1,767 249 446
VT - 5 71 38 34
2 S. Atlantic 2,495 1, 174 4,460 987 113
DE 70 37 126 0 0
FL 587 314 1,439 204 1
GA 711 311 792 166 33
MD 288 174 492 109 17
NC 501 153 734 311 53
SC - 37 115 - -
VA 338 148 762 197 9
3 Midwest 8,604 4,306 7,638 1,368 228
AL 661 215 562 122 77
IL 758 887 1,183 545 1
IN 1,192 416 825 0 5
KY 747 178 488 0 30
MI 840 671 907 156 13
MS 122 212 381 84 0
OH 1,433 747 1,142 82 2
PA 1,381 649 1,297 380 12
TN 599 207 594 (1) 78




Region Coal Gas Oil U308 Hydro
4 W-N Central 2,175 1,439 2,706 505 177
IA 287 202 324 27 10
KS 267 341 401 70 0
MN 256 232 489 126 29
MO 528 234 612 66 15
NE 116 101 203 93 16
ND 319 26 117 0 35
SD 15 21 104 0 56
WI 387 282 456 123 16
5 W-S Central 1,828 5,788 6,474 258 77
AK 211 172 299 124 25
LA 172 1,561 1,436 134 0
OK 241 618 413 0 30
TX 1,204 3,437 4,326 0 22
6 Mountain 1,685 759 1,480 148 319
AZ 283 113 343 146 105
CO 297 210 338 2 19
ID 9 38 109 0 84
MT 133 40 137 0 92
NM 261 165 216 0 2
UT 274 107 206 0 9
WY 428 86 131 0 8
7 Pacific 306 2,508 4,940 437 1,521
AL 4 252 207 0 9
CA 45 1,993 3,324 330 333
HI 2 3 229 0 1
NE 155 42 156 0 26
OR 4 82 335 47 420
WA 96 136 689 60 732
Total 17,656 17,533 32,457 4,516 3,062
Source: EIA/DOE , 1988, State Energy and Expenditure Report
1987, U.S. Government Printing Of f ice, Washington, D.C.
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1 N. Atlantic 0 26 710
(0) (0) (0)
2 S. Atlantic 44,087 28 8,287
(5) (0) (0)
3 Midwest 538,374 968 127,047
(60) (6) (4)
4 W. N. Central 30,686 524 109,080
(3) (3) (4)
5 W. S. Central 45,803 13,395 1,410,113
(5) (77) (46)
6 Mountain 226,970 1,620 277,375
(25) (9) (9)
7 Pacific 4,722 788 1,114,771
(1) (5) (37)
Total 890,642 17,349 3,047,383
(100) (100) (100)
N o t e : Coal statistics represents 1984 production, gas and 
oil are 1987 figures.
Mcf = thousand cubic feet.
Numbers in parentheses represent production percentages.
Sources: EIA/DOE, 1989, Petroleum Supply Annual 1988. U.S 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.
EIA/DOE, 1989, Gas Supply Annual 1988. Ibid.
EIA/DOE, 1985, Coal Quarterly 1984. Ibid.
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Table 3.9 1987 Regional Consumption Patterns
(in tera-Btu)
Coal Gas Oil Nuclear Hydro
1 N. Atlantic 563 1,559 4,759 813 627
(3) (9) (15) (18) (20)
2 S. Atlantic 2,495 1, 174 4,460 987 113
(14) (7) (14) (22) (4)
3 Midwest 8,604 4,306 7 ,638 1,368 228
(49) (25) (24) (30) (7)
4 W-N Central 2, 175 1,439 2,706 505 177
(12) (8) (8) (11) (6)
5 W-S Central 1,828 5, 788 6,474 258 (77
(10) (33) (20) (6) (3)
6 Mountain 1,685 759 1,480 148 319
(10) (4) (5) (3) (10)
7 Pacific 306 2,508 4,940 437 1,521
(2) (14) (15) (10) (50)
Total 17,656 17,533 32,457 4,516 3,062
(100) (100) (100) (100) (100)
N o t e : Numbers in parentheses represent consumption
percentages
Source: EIA/DOE, 1989, State Energy Expenditure Report 1987, 
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.
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to the distance delivered. For instance, because co a l ’s Btu 
content per unit volume is low, freight expense makes long 
distance coal deliveries uneconomic, so the North Atlantic 
region consumes relatively less coal. Even so, while the 
Eastern seaboard is equally poor in oil as it is in coal, 
together, the North and South Atlantic regions consumed 29% 
of U.S. of petroleum demand. Compared to nuclear fuel and 
oil, gas consumption is nearly nonexistent unless pipelines 
are present. The Midwest region, which produces 6% of gas 
supply, consumed 25% of U.S. natural gas demand. The 
largest exporting region is the Southwest Central region, 
where less than 50% of production is consumed internally.
The Pacific region consumes more gas then it produces, but 
excluding Alaska, the remaining Pacific coast states import 
nearly all natural gas. Gas imports, and consequently, 
consumption, are lowest in the North Atlantic states. A gas 
pipeline map of the United States, Pipeline Transportation 
Systems (USGS, 1974) shows a single 22-inch gas pipeline 
extending north from Boston to Portland, Maine, and a single 
6-inch petroleum product pipeline from Portland to Bangor, 
Maine. This is the only connection for Maine, New 
Hampshire, and Vermont, and explains the relatively low gas 
consumption and high prices in the North Atlantic region.
Relatively higher coal consumption by coal-producing
T-4071 54
regions indicates that most coal does not leave the region 
where it was produced. For instance, Midwestern coal 
consumption is more than 80% of internal production.
Mountain states also export relatively more coal than the 
Midwest. The major coal-importing regions are the Northwest 
Central and the South Atlantic, while the North Atlantic 
region imports small quantities.
Regional disparities in geologic occurrence and 
transportation distances are likewise reflected in prices. 
Table 3.10 shows prices and relative price levels for the 
three major energy commodity groups in the seven regions. 
South Atlantic customers pay the highest coal premiums, 
reflecting both the distance delivered and fuel quality.
The Southwest Central and Pacific gas-producing regions 
receive significant discounts for gas, and the Midwest, 
which imports most gas, paid a 12% premium in 1987. Oil 
prices vary the least on a regional basis, but are lowest in 
the Southwest Central region, and highest in the Midwest and 
Mountain region.
Electric utility consumption patterns generally follow 
regional pricing and fuel production patterns, especially* in 
coal use, since utilities dominate coal demand markets, seen 
in Table 3.11. Percentages under each commodity shown in 
Table 3.11 are the fraction of U.S. utility demand within
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Table 3.10 1987 Regional Prices








1 N. Atlantic 1.71 10.7 5.16 26.8 5.83 1.7
2 S. Atlantic 1.74 13.3 4.37 7.5 6.16 7.6
3 Midwest 1.58 2.9 4. 54 11.5 6.43 12.2
4 NW Central 1.35 -12.4 3.95 -2.8 6.54 14.2
5 SW Central 1. 56 1.3 2.34 -42.6 5.20 -9.2
6 Mountain 1.11 -27.9 4.14 1.6 6.42 12.1
7 Pacific 1.63 5.9 3.58 -12.1 5.86 2.3
U.S. Average 1.54 4.07 5.73
Source: EIA/DOE, 1989, State Energy Fuel and Expenditure
Report 1987 , U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 
D.C.
the respective region. For instance, 46% of electric 
utility coal demand is consumed in the Midwest, the region 
with the largest fraction of coal demand. Almost half of 
U.S. natural gas demand by utilities occurs in the Southwest 
Central region. Over 80% of oil consumption by utilities 
occurs west of the Mississippi River, in the North and South 
Atlantic, and Midwest regions. Likewise, most nuclear fuel 
demand is in eastern states. Over half the hydroelectric 
power generation occurs in the Pacific and North Atlantic.
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Table 3.11 1987 Electric Utility Consumption Patterns
(in tera-Btu)
Coal Gas Oil U308 Hydro
N. Atlantic 446 305 693 807 608
(3) (9) (38) (16) (21)
S. Atlantic 2,368 207 301 1,402 134
(16) (6) (16) (28) (5)
Midwest 6,821 227 511 1,388 189
(46) (7) (28) (28) (7)
NW Central 1,541 71 (12 519 156
( 10) (2) (1) (10) (5)
SW Central 1,737 1,574 8 255 77
(12) (48) (0) (5) (3)
Mountain 1,605 162 211 239 211
( U ) (5) (11) (5) (7)
Pacific 245 706 108 434 1,510
(2) (22) (6) (9) (52)
Total 14,763 3,252 1,844 5,045 2,885
(100) (100) (100) ( 100) ( 100
N o t e : Numbers in parentheses represent percent of total
electric utility consumption within respective regions.
Source: EIA/DOE, 1989, State Energy Data Report 1988, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.
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Chapter 4
FIRM DESCRIPTION AND ELASTICITY ESTIMATION
4.1 Introduction
This chapter will examine conditions under which 
optimum fuel-input demand levels by the electric utility 
industry lead to profit maximization and cost minimization. 
This discussion of firm theory is broken down into the 
characteristics of production functions, related cost 
function characteristics, and the dual relationship between 
the firm's production technology and economic structure, 
described by its cost function. Technical characteristics 
of industry behavior in response to price change will be 
evaluated by own- and cross-price elasticities.
The approach estimates elasticities with an econometric 
demand model of six utility fuel inputs solved by iterative, 
seemingly unrelated least squares regression. The data set 
is fuel consumption, prices, and output by 82 investor-owned 
utilities during 1987. Such a short period implies that 
firms observe short-run profit restrictions on their 
production functions. Short-run assumptions imply further 
that fixed inputs remain unchanged during the period, 
eliminating the likelihood that technological improvements 
will change. Short-run restrictions apply to the associated
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cost function as well.
4.2 A Short-Run Production Model for Electric Utilities
Neoclassic production functions are assumed to be 
technologically efficient, i.e., when all inputs have been 
applied to the point where it is no longer possible to 
achieve the same output using less of one input and no more 
of any other input. Additional resources cannot be applied 
efficiently if other resources required by the technology 
are held constant. On the other hand, technological 
efficiency does imply that if one input is increased and all 
other inputs are held constant, output must increase. In 
other words, an efficient technological frontier can not be 
improved upon, but less efficient resource mixes are 
possible.
The multi-product production function takes the form:
Q = (qi » q2 i . • • , qs )
= F(Xl , X2 , . . . , x & ). (4.1
The corresponding profit function is the difference between 
revenue, (price times output quantity), and cost components 
(input prices times quantities) shown below in equation
(4.2).
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7C = Sqi Pi - 2wj Xj (4.2)
Mathematical forms used to describe production in 
competitive markets are expected to be concave functions 
with monotonically increasing cost functions. Cost 
equations are linear in inputs. These characteristics are 
embodied in the functional form chosen to describe the 
production technology that guarantee certain behavioral 
characteristics of competitive markets: concavity 
incorporates diminishing returns phenomena and downward 
sloping demand curves, and monotonic cost functions ensure 
that costs rise during price inflation. As specified in 
equation (4.2), both price, pi , and input costs, w, , are 
scalar (constant) quantities. Output price is postulated as 
a constant price because electricity price is regulated, and 
input prices, though supplied in competitive markets, are 
determined exogenously by their individual markets.
Some assumptions about market and firm behavior are 
implied by this profit specification. Utility output is 
represented by the sum of exogenously determined retail and 
wholesale demand. Production levels, commodity mix, and 
input requirements are determined endogenously, considering 
existing demand, the current generating technology 
available, and prevailing fuel prices. Furthermore, inputs
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are assumed to be competitively priced. In addition, 
commodity demand for a given observation point is 
interpreted as the cost-minimizing solution of the observed 
firm's profit-maximizing level. This assumption permits 
input demand to be derived from cost functions. Statistical 
errors in profit functions are random errors arising from 
deviations from cost-minimizing behavior (and includes the 
cumulative effects of all omitted variables).
The theoretical utility can be modeled as a short-run, 
profit-maximizing firm producing one output from a suite of 
six energy inputs transformed by a technology mix of 
generation equipment. Labor and capital services are not 
included in the short-run technology. In chapter 2, it was 
shown that labor costs are a minor but significant portion 
of generation costs. However, previous research has 
indicated that labor costs are not related to short-run 
cost-minimization. McFadden (1978), studied elasticity of 
substitution between labor, capital, and fuel, and although 
he cautioned that his test had weak explanatory power, 
accepted the hypothesis that fuel did not substitute for any 
combination of capital or labor. Fuss (1977), estimated 
labor, capital, and fuel substitution and concluded that the 
cross-elasticity of fuel substitution for labor was 
approximately 0.6, and for economic purposes, labor
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substitution for fuel i?as zero. These two studies indicate 
that labor costs may be omitted from the input demand model 
in this research without damaging the empirical results.
In addition to the option of producing power with self­
owned generation capacity, a utility may decide to meet 
retail demand by purchasing power from other utilities. A 
unique aspect of wholesale power markets is that utilities 
may switch between net buying and net selling on an hourly 
basis, however, consumption effects of buy/sell cycles as 
short as one day escape detection by annual observations. 
Neither are load curve variables captured to account for the 
influence time-of-use has on input demand, such as load- 
shifting practices which consume more expensive capacity 
resources during peak demand. Consequently, wholesale power 
is treated the same as other energy commodities.
4.3 First Order Conditions
The following cost model development is taken from 
Henderson and Quandt (1980). A production function with s 
outputs and n inputs has the implicit functional form
F(qi , qa » . . , q8 > xi , Xa » . . . , xn ) = 0. (4.3)
The production function is assumed to possess the
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neoclassical production theory characteristics stated above: 
continuous, non-zero first and second partial derivatives; 
increasing output monotonicity; linear homogeneity in 
inputs; and regular, strict convexity over the positive 
input and output quadrant. At this point in model 
development, constant returns to scale are implied by linear 
homogeneity, but this restriction may be relaxed if constant 
elasticities of substitution are not required.
Profit is maximized subject to the available technology 
represented by the implicit production function, according 
to the objective function. That is, maximizing equation
(4.2) subject to equation (4.3) results in the following 
Lagrangian:
where 0 is the Lagrangian multiplier. For an interior 
solution, first order conditions imply that
s n
Xn ) = 0 (4.4)
S_7t =  p i  + 0 F i  
8qi
0 (i = 1, 2 s ) (4.5 a )
§JL
8xj




6 F(qi , q2 , . . • , qs ,
Xi , x 2 , . . . t x n ) = 0 (4.5c)
where Fi is the derivative of (4.3) with respect tori.
Equating (4.5a) to (4.5b) to solve for 0, leaas to the 
following relationship:
reproducing the usual condition that at profit maximization, 
the marginal rate of product transformation for each output 
with respect to each input must equal the price for that 
input.
Another familiar production function property important 
to the input demand system is the relationship between 
inputs and their prices. Taking any two equations from 
(4.5b), dividing either one by the other to solve for input 
price, leads to the determination of marginal rate of 
technical substitution (MRTS):
rj/pk = Fs + j/Fk = 8qk/6v- (j, k = 1, . . . , s )
or restated,
Pk 8qk /8xi (4.6)
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Wj /wk = - Xk/Xj = MPk/MPj
= - <8f<x* )/5xk)/(6f<x*)/8xj ) = MRTS (4.7)
where f(x*) is the profit-maximizing output quantity (at 
optimum input mix x * ); wi is the input price; and MP is the 
marginal product of f(x) with respect to Xi .
The MRTS for every pair of inputs--holding the levels 
of all outputs and all other inputs constant--must equal the 
ratio of their prices. Thus, cost minimization implies that 
a firm adjusts its input mix until the MRTS among inputs 
equals the market-determined price ratio for these inputs. 
This is known as the tangency condition. Tangency occurs at 
the point where the slope of the cost equation is tangent to 
the production function, implying that an optimal solution 
is obtained when the marginal rate of technical substitution 
equals the input price ratio (Binger and Hoffman, 1988).
4.4 Second Order Conditions
Second order conditions for profit maximization require 
a negative, semi-definite bordered Hessian matrix; i.e., the 
second-order partial derivatives with respect to inputs 
prices must alternate in sign. Also, the Hessian matrix is 
symmetric because partial differentials are indifferent to 
the order of differentiation, as shown in equation (4.8)
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(Varian, 1984 ) .
82 f (x ) /5xj 8xi S2 f (x ) /8xi 8xj (4.8)
4.5 Substitution Effects
Profit-maximizing firms adjust their output levels and 
input consumption in response to input price changes by- 
varying input levels to maintain equality between the 
incremental cost of additional input and the incremental 
income accrued through its application to the production 
process. When more than one input is required and relative 
input prices change, input mix is adjusted to the point 
where net input cost is equal to additional income per unit
If q, in equation (4.5a) were replaced by the profit- 
maximizing production level, q(x*), the input vector that 
maximizes profits at a given production level is a function 
of output prices and input costs, given by
sold.
x* = x(p,w) (4.9)
This results in the ordinary input demand from profit 
maximization of equation (4.2) subject to (4.3). The first 
order conditions for profit maximization, evaluated at x * ,
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would be
p q f(x (p ,w )) - w = 0 (4.10)
where q ’(x(p,w)) is the first derivative of production with 
respect to x. If this identity were differentiated with 
respect to input price, the result would be
Maintaining the neoclassical condition that production 
functions have non-zero second partial derivatives, the 
expression becomes:
The righthand term of equation (4.12) is the substitution 
matrix, the inverted Hessian of the production function 
times output price. Because the substitution matrix is the 
inverse of a symmetrical matrix, the substitution matrix is 
also symmetrical as well as negative semi-definite. For 
profit maximization, this implies that principal minor 
determinants alternate in sign, and. under cost minimization, 
the relevant Hessian determinant is negative semi-definite.
p q "[x (p ,w )]d x (p ,w )/dw - 1 0 (4.11)
d x (p ,w )/dw = 1/pq* *[x(p ,w ) ] (4.12)
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4.6 Cost Functions and Cost Minimization
Cost functions are the economic analogues to 
technological descriptions of firm behavior provided by 
production functions. The firm’s economic and technological 
functions can be expressed by the system:
q = f(xi , x2 i . . • , xB ) ,
c = b + Zxi Wi ,
0 = G(xi, x 2 , . . . , X n ), (4.13)
where c is cost, b is the fixed cost intercept, and the 
input costs, w, multiplied by input quantities, x, are 
variable costs. This system can be reduced to a single 
function
C = C( qi , q2 , . . . , qs i wi w2 , . . . , w B ) (4.14)
in which cost is stated as an explicit function of output 
level and input prices. To be necessary and sufficient 
conditions for cost minimization, the cost function should 
retain the characteristics of the production function: 
monotonically increasing in input prices and output, linear 
homogeneity, and concave in input prices.
T-4071 68
4.7 Shephard’s Lemma
Concavity in input prices is a result of a symmetrical 
matrix of factor demand functions constrained to possess 
negative own-price effects (if an input’s cost increases, 
its consumption level decreases); and positive cross-price 
effects (in response to the price increase of one commodity, 
consumers demand more of substitute commodities). A linear 
cost function satisfies this property; however, concave 
functions allow for costs to increase at a decreasing rate 
as the other inputs become more important in quantitative 
share of production costs. As consumers substitute more 
competing commodities in the production process for higher 
priced commodities, the higher priced input forms a 
progressively lower fraction of the consumer’s production 
process, and additional price increments have a successively 
smaller impact on total cost.
The direct effect of price change is the firm’s 
decreased expenditure on those relatively more expensive 
input; indirect effects are increased consumption of 
relatively lower priced commodities. Assuming the firm were 
operating at a cost-minimizing point, any infinitesimal 
change will result in zero additional profits. This is 
consistent with the principle of monotonicity, which 
precludes higher profits under conditions of rising input
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costs.
Figure 4.1 shows a cost equation given by
C wi xi + 2wi Xi (4.15)
and a concave cost function given by
C C(w,q) (4.16)
The cost equation is linear in prices and input levels, 
while the cost function is concave in input prices. The two 
lines coincide at wi*, the cost minimization point, implying 
equal first derivatives, shown below:
Shephard’s lemma states that optimum, cost-minimizing 
input levels are equal to the first derivatives of the cost 
function with respect to input prices and output (Fuss, 
1977). Therefore equation 4.17 is the fundamental form used 
here to denote the input factor demand functions.
4.8 Elasticity of Substitution
Quantitative measures of how the production technology
8C/6wi x* 8 C (w ,q )/Sw (4.17)
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c
C ( q , w )
w*
Figure 4.1 The Cost Function and Cost Equation
Source: Varian, Hal R., 1984, MicroeconomicAnalysis, W. W.
Norton and Company, New York.
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converts inputs into outputs and substitutes inputs for one 
another, require that relationships be defined between the 
economics of business activities and their technological 
structure. Elasticity of substitution is a common measure 
of substitution between inputs, and duality is a convenient 
approach to derive substitution elasticity relationships.
The term duality describes those characteristics of 
mathematical production systems which relate economic 
effects (input price ratios) to technical solutions 
(relative input quantities), and allows prediction of future 
demand. The discussion which follows is after Varian, 1984. 
First order conditions for cost minimization require cost- 
minimizing price ratios directly proportional to the ratio 
of marginal products, defining the rate of profit- 
maximizing production change with respect to infinitesimal 
input demand changes (repeated below for convenience).
w* i /w* j = -MPi /MPj
= [8f(x*)/6xi ] / [5f(x*)/8xj] (4.7)
The full derivative of (4.7) results in
dxj (x* ) /dxi “  W|  / W j  . (4.18)
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One expression of the dual relationship between 
production and cost functions is that the slope of the 
isoquant curve gives the ratio of factor prices and the 
isocost curve gives the ratio of the input levels, shown in 
Figure 4.2
The convenient aspect of duality for economic analysis 
is that a production technology’s structure can be recovered 
from an econometric analysis of the cost function. As shown 
earlier,
wi /w2 = MPi /MP2 (4.7)
at profit maximization and cost minimization optima. Allen 
(1938) defined the elasticity of the function y = f(x) as 
the rate of proportional change in y per unit proportional 
change in x as
E y / E x  = d ln(y)/d ln(x) = (x/y)(dy/dx). (4.19)
Allen elasticities of substitution are not constrained to be 
constant, but may vary with the value of the cost share.
To find the response of factor mix ratio to change in 
the factor price ratio, the equivalent expression would be
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Isoquant Q =f(x1, x2)
Isocost C =C (q , w)
Figure 4.2 Isocost-Isoquant Duality
Source: Varian, Hal R . , 1984, Microeconomic Analysis. W. W.
Norton and Company, New York.
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d ln(xi /xj ) (wi/w2 ) d(xi/x2 ) (4.20)
o( q,w) - ^ In(w»/W2 ) " (xj/xj) d(wi/w2 )
where a(q,w) is the elasticity of substitution. Using 
homogeneity conditions and Shephard’s lemma, McFadden (1978 
shows that
d ln(xi /xj ) = Ci j * Ci j * [d ln(wi/w2 )]
Ci * Cj (4.21)
where Ci equals the first partial differential of C with 
respect to w i .
Solving the expression for elasticity of substitution 
from equation 4.18, the result is shown below.
a(q,w) = d[ln(xi /Xj )]/d[ln(wi/w2 )]
= Ci j * Ci j /Ci * Cj (4.22)
The elasticity of substitution can be reduced to a function 
of first and second partials of the cost function with 
respect to input prices.
4.9 Conclusions
Since demand and supply functions are derivatives of 
cost functions, cost function properties translate into
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restrictions on its derivatives: the factor demand functions 
given above by equation (4.17).
The first derivative of the cost function is equivalent 
to the factor demand function; the factor demand first 
derivatives are likewise the second derivatives of the cost 
function and equivalent to the cost function's bordered 
Hessian and therefore are both symmetric and negative semi- 
definite. Positive second partial derivatives of non­
diagonal Hessian elements indicate negative semi­
definiteness (McFadden, 1978). Table 4.1 summarizes 
implications for the factor demand functions.
The most important implications from this result are 
symmetrical cross-price effects and negative own-price 
effects, i.e., negative own-price elasticity of demand. 
Implications for cost equation estimation by this research 
are summarized in Table 4.2.
As shown, the decision to buy or sell may be motivated 
by either profit-maximization or cost-minimization 
objectives. Any time a utility purchases power below its 
own decremental generation costs, it demonstrates cost- 
minimizing behavior, and whenever the utility sells above 
its own incremental costs, it demonstrates profit-maximizing 
behavior. The next chapter presents the empirical model, 
and discusses regression techniques and empirical tests.
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Table 4.1 Cost Function Criteria Related to Factor Demand
Cost Function Factor Demand Functions
Increasing in 
factor prices
5C ( q , w) /8wi 
= xi (q,w) > 0
C(q,w) is homogeneous 
of degree one in 
in factor prices
Derivatives are 
homogeneous of degree 
zero
C(q,w) is concave 
in factor prices
The matrix of 1st deri­
vatives of factor demand 
functions is a symmetric 
negative, semi-definite 
matrix




6xi _ 82 C _ 62 C _ 5xj 
6wj 8wj Wi 6wi Wj 8wj
Own-price effects 
are negative




TRANSCENDENTAL LOGARITHMIC FUNCTIONS 
AND ENERGY SUBSTITUTION
5.1 Introduction
To restate the objective of the current research, the 
intent is to determine substitution between primary fuels by 
electric utilities. Included in this objective is to 
measure substitution by utilities who have the option of 
fulfilling retail demand with wholesale power purchases.
The approach is to model primary fuel demand by electric 
utilities as a cost-minimizing mix of primary fuel prices 
using the transcendental logarithmic function, a form which 
permits flexibility in returns to scale and elasticities of 
substitution. The data is cross-sectional consumption and 
prices for fuel and wholesale power by 82 utilities during 
1987.
Substitution will be measured from calculations 
developed for the Allen-Uzawa elasticity of substitution 
(Allen, 1938, Uzawa, 1962) and the associated price 
elasticity of demand defined in chapter 4. The parameters 
necessary for elasticity calculation will be estimated 
regression parameters^ from 'a normalized cost function, the
reduced form of the production system. Reduced form refers
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to a functional form where all explanatory variables are 
exogenous; i.e., factors influencing their magnitude are 
beyond the control of the optimizing agent.
The preferred approach might be to estimate production 
functions direcgjbJ-X^. but is impractical because capital 
service costs cannot be precisely measured and omitted 
variables create problems in specifying the technology
e
(Denny and Pinto, 1978).
Estimating production functions by ordinary least 
squares (OLS) estimation is not likely to result in good 
estimates. The measures of output will likely correlate 
with unobserved variables in the error term because firm 
managers observe phenomena not specified by the production 
function, or other omitted and unmeasurable factors, such as 
changing consumer tastes, influencing production decisions. 
The classic example is a technology specification for wheat 
production which omits a measure for weather. A farmer's 
production and input level decisions (measured by 
explanatory variables) depend upon variations in the 
weather, effects of which are contained in the error term. 
However, a farmer might conceivably invest in additional 
capital (such as a water well) if rainfall is lower than 
anticipated. Low farm output is expected when rainfall is 
low, but capital expenditure will appear related with
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output, and lower output will be interpreted as a random 
deviation from optimizing behavior. The inclusion of 
explanatory variables (such as capital expenditure in the 
farming example) correlated with behavior contained in the 
error term violates the fundamental OLS assumption that 
dependent variables are uncorrelated with the error term.
In the farming example, variations in technology and 
other unseen effects are known to managers, but not to 
observers. Observed factor inputs are endogenous if random 
effects of technology and economic variation are known to 
the production unit, and exogenous if the random effects are 
not known by managers. A more proper method, and less 
susceptible to introduced errors, is to measure conditional 
input demand functions to infer the underlying technological 
structure.
5.2 The Transcendental Logarithmic Production Function
Production functions and their cost functions were 
originally described by two-input, nonlinear mathematic 
relationships. The Cobb-Douglas production technology is a 
conventional model used in early empirical studies to relate 
output to highly aggregated inputs of capital and labor. 
However, technology described by highly aggregated two- 
input systems are not useful for microeconomic analysis. An
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attractive approach would be to specify a Cobb-Douglas 
technology with less aggregated input factors (Berndt and 
Christensen, 1973), but Leontief (1947a and 1947b) has shown 
that multi-input Cobb-Douglas technologies imply strong 
separability between inputs, and that multi-factor analogues 
of conventional two-input models impose constant 
elasticities of substitution among inputs.
In the early 1970s, research focused on identifying 
specifications which do not require strictly separable 
technologies. Diewert (1971) proposed the Generalized 
Leontief Production Function, a quadratic form in an 
arbitrary number of inputs. Christensen, Jorgensen, and Lau 
(1973) proposed the transcendental logarithmic production 
function (abbreviated to translog) which permits an 
arbitrary number of linear and quadratic inputs.
Separability can be imposed on the translog form by 
parametric restrictions (and tested to validate the 
separability assumption).
5.3 Separability and Implications for Functional Form
Separability is a structural property in a production 
technology which permits econometric analysis to be
performed in terms of subsets, or input groups, of the total,   .
set of possible variables. When large numbers of inputs are
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measured, the unhindered ability to assume separability 
between inputs a l i o ^  j;e^g^xcKe^s->Xo.-speei-#y—more^fiex-i-ble 
functional forms, and focus on a specific class of inputs 
(Fuss, McFadden, and Mundlak, 1978).
In terms of utility inputs, aggregated inputs may be 
classified into three input groups:\capitaljservices/labor 
and, fuel/ Fuel is understood to be any energy source, 
including wholesale power. Subinputs within input groups 
are disaggregated elements within a category. Capital sub­
inputs are equipment and structures, and correspondingly, 
labor may be disintegrated into management and production 
labor. In the present study, fuel breaks down into six 
subcategories: coal, nuclear, gas, oil, hydroelectric, and 
wholesale power.
Separability is characterized by the independence of 
the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between a pair of 
inputs from changes in the level of a third input. If a set 
of inputs, N, is separated into groups Si and S2 , where the 
Si * s are wholly-contained subsets of N, MRS independence is 
shown by the relationship:




where fi and fj are first differentials of the production 
function in Si and S2 respectively, and Sqk is marginal 
output with respect to a third input k, a member of a third 
input group, S3 . The ratio of marginal products (i.e., 
price ratios) is independent of change in a third input....    -iirnj | ,r ,c-
group.
ALstrongly separable function with respect to the group
_
S implies that (5.1) holds for(^all\ disaggregated and 
aggregated inputs. In the electric utility industry, this 
premise could be interpreted to mean that in the short run, 
all fuel subinputs are unrelated to other input categories: 
equipment, and production and management labor. |Wea^k^/ 
separability refers to production functions where equation 
(5.1) holds for elements within an input group unrelated to 
other categories.
In terms of the present study, the analogous statement 
would be that the individual marginal rate of substitutions 
for fuel inputs are independent of equipment and labor input 
levels. Christensen, Jorgensen, and Lau (1973) use the 
concept of duality between cost and production to show the 
cost function which corresponds to a separable production 
function is itself separable.
The analytical penalty paid for failure to meet 
separability conditions is biased parameter estimates.
  ,||,l(fnw-— v . i , .   * .
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Individual input measurements in disaggregated technology 
descriptions will correlate with omitted variables whose
.     .— —Tira. ■Ltwiiovrffl I w r ,r " * J*
unobserved behavior is retained in the error term. Assuming 
the omitted variables (capital and labor, among others) are 
positively correlated with electric output, the parameter 
estimates will err in the direction of correlation between 
the omitted variables and included variables.
There may be evidence to suspect that for plant-level 
electric production, fuel selection is somewhat dependent on 
equipment selection because coal and nuclear consumption is 
likely to be associated with large capacity plants, high 
production levels, and large factor share. Consequently, an 
expanded Cobb-Douglas model of this industry may fail to 
meet the strict separability requirements of the Cobb- 
Douglas or constant elasticities of substitution families of 
production functions. A specification is necessary, such as 
the translog function, that does not require a strictly 
separable technology. In the following section, a translog 
econometric model is developed.
5.4 Translog Production Function Approximation
The ensuing translog model specification development 
follows the method of Berndt and Christensen (1973) in their 
study of the substitution between equipment, structures, and
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labor in U.S manufacturing; and Berndt and Wood (1975) in 
their study of aggregated energy demand models in the U.S
economy
The translog production fungtdon is irsjfc-order
Taylor expansion about an arbitrary point in the production 
function written as
In Q = lnao + aAlnA + Si a\ lnxi + |xAA(ln A)2
+ SiSj Ti j lnxi lnxj + SiXiAlnxilnA (5.2)
where ¥ is output, the xi are inputs/ A is a technology
index, the Greek letters are parameters, and xi j = Xj i , 
(because of symmetry). If constant returns to scale apply, 
the following restrictions apply.
Si cti = 1
S i Xi j — 0
S i X i A — 0 (5.3)
Across the data sample, technology is assumed to be 
equally distributed. For instance, generation plants at all 
utilities have the same approximate age and operate at the 
same approximate heat rate. If constant returns to scale 




t a  a = 0
Ti a = 0 (5.4)
Hicksian neutrality implies that the ratio of the 
marginal products of any two inputs is independent of time, 
and consequently, the derived demand for any two inputs is 
also independent of time (Lau, 1978). In the case of 
electric power production, this assumption implies that 
productivity improvements among competing technologies 
progresses equally. For example, turbine heat' rate 
efficiency, which impacts marginal costs, increases for gas 
turbines at the same rate as for all other competing 
technologies.
With constant returns to scale and Hick’s neutral 
technical change imposed, interaction terms are eliminated, 
and the translog production function is written in the 
simplified form:
In Q = In A + lnao + Si ai lnxi + Si Sj Ti j lnxi lnxj (5.5)
Furthermore, if the function F is defined as
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In F  = In Q  - In A  = lnao + 2i a\ lnxj
+ Si 2j Ti j lnxi lnxj (5.6)
where Q is transformed by the relationship, V = AF; i.e., 
individual inputs are transformed into aggregate input F by 
the translog input function, and then, aggregate input F is 
transformed into output by the scalar technology index A.
The logarithmic marginal productivity conditions on Q and F 
are equal and independent of A.
61n Q = 61n F = a-, + Sj Ti j In Xj
Sin Xi Sin Xi (5.7)
Because the translog function has quadratic terms, it 
has several maxima and minima points which will satisfy 
optimality conditions, implying that it is not globally 
monotonic or convex, if at least one Ti j does not equal 
zero. However, there are regions of input space where 
monotonicity and convexity will be satisfied, large enough 
that the translog function will provide a good 
representation of relevant production possibilities.
Monotonicity requires that the first partial 
differential of F with respect to the input factors Xi is
positive (i.e., increasing inputs means increased
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production). Since the Xi and F are always positive, an 
equivalent set of conditions is written
where Mi is the logarithmic marginal product. Assuming 
competitive markets, a set of necessary conditions for 
efficient production is
where Pi is the price of the ith input relative to the price 
of the aggregate input F. This says, in competitive 
markets, marginal productivity achieved through recruitment 
of an additional unit of input is equal to the price of that 
input.
Equation (5.8) can then be written as
Mi = 8In F/8lnxi = (8F/8xi )(xi/F) > 0 (5.8)
8F = Pi 
6xi
(5.9)
Mi = (5F/5xi ) (xi /F) = Pi Xi /F > 0 (5.10)
which, as shown, must be positive for monotonicity to hold. 
Since Pi multiplied by Xi is total expenditure on input Xi ,
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and F is total output, the cost share of x is given by
Pi Xi /F (5.11)
In other words, cost shares are equal to marginal 
productivity and are approximations of cost-minimizing 
conditions for profit-maximizing firms. Monotonicity and 
convexity conditions may be verified by statistical tests.
The firm’s cost model is developed in the next section, 
a more convenient approach to cost-minimization analysis.
5.5 Translog Cost Function Approximation
As stated in section 5.1, dual relationships between 
cost and production functions expeditiously avoid typical 
difficulties encountered when estimating production 
functions directly, such as choosing (or locating) 
appropriate proxy variables for capital service costs and 
technical description. All essential structural 
characteristics of a production technology can be derived 
from the resulting cost function, the basis for all 
subsequent regression analysis.
Production functions for electric utility power 
generation are assumed to take the form
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(q, X c , X o f X g , X n , X h , X w ) (5.12)
= total retail and wholesale power sales 
= coal consumption
= oil, fuel oil, and distillate consumption 
= natural gas consumption 
= nuclear fuel
= hydroelectric power production 
= wholesale power consumption
All inputs are measured in British thermal units (or, in the 
case of wholesale and hydroelectric power, in Btu 
equivalents adjusted for thermal efficiency). The 
corresponding cost function for this production technology 
is given by
C = C(q, wc , W o , wg , wn , W h , w « ) (5.13)
where q = total retail and wholesale power sales
wc = coal cost
w0 = oil, fuel oil, and distillate cost 
wg = natural gas cost 
w n = nuclear fuel cost










ww = wholesale power cost
Uzawa (1964) shows that if a function possesses the 
following properties:
Homogeneity of degree one in factor costs
Factor cost concavity
Factor costs increasing monotonically
Cost continuity 
then that function sufficiently describes the cost function 
of that technology. As stated, dual characteristics between 
cost and production allow technological structure to be 
determined from cost functions. The convenience obtained 
here allows analysis of strictly inseparable technologies in 
more detail possible than with more restrictive functions.
A translog cost function approximation meets these 
criteria. The analogous translog cost function is a first 
order Taylor expansion about an arbitrary point of the cost 
function given by equation (5.13), shown below.
In C(q,w) = lnao + Si ai lnwi + 2k pqk 
+ |2i Sj tj k lnwi *lnwj 
+ iSi Sk 6jklnq*lnwi
+ |2i Sk 0jklnq*lnwi (5.14)
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where
Wi = input price for the ith factor
i t J = wc , Wo , wg , Wn , Wh , and ww
q = total output
at the point of expansion, (q = 1, wc = 1 ,  w0 = 1 ,  wg = 1 ,  
w n = 1, wh = 1, Ww = 1), and joint cost function parameters 
are equal to the first and second order derivatives of the 
approximation with respect to input prices.
The input demand function is determined from Shephard's 
lemma, restated in equation (5.15):
8C/8wi = 8C(q,w)/8wi = x*
= f (q , wc , W o , W g , W n , W w ). (5.15)
The partial derivative of the translog cost function 
with respect to logarithms of input price is
8 (In C)/8(ln w) = (wi * x*)/C = Si (5.16)
where x* is the consumption level of input x, at cost
minimization. The term (wi * x * )/C is interpreted as the
cost share of input i (Si ), because W i x* is the expenditure 
on input i at cost minimization for output q. C represents
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total cost, given by the cost equation:
C = bo + 2 (wi * Xi ) .
To summarize, the estimated system is represented by
8 (In C)/8(ln w) = Wi x*/C = Si
= at + 2j Ti i lnwi + 2k Siklnqk
The individual conditional demand functions are
S W j — Cw + Tw wlnWw + TwcInWc + TwoInWo
+ iwglnwg + T w u l n w u + Tw hInWh
+ 8wr ln q /i + 0wj
Sc j = a c + Tew lnww + Tc c l n w c + Tc o InWo
+ Xc glnwg + T e a l n w u + Tc hInWh
+ 8c r lnq f' + 0c i
So j = a 0 + Tc 0 lnww + To c lnwc + To o l n w 0
+ To glnwg + To ulnwu + To hInWh
+ So r l n q  q + 0o j
Sg i = a g + TgwlnWw + Tg c l n w c + Tg 0 InWo
+ Tg glnwg + Tg U l n w u + Tg bInWh







SUj = a u + Tuwlnww + Tuclnwc + x Uo ln w0
+ T u g l n w g  + T u u l n w u  + T u h l n w h
+ 8 U r l n q  + 0u j (5*19©)
Shj = ah + Th wlnww + thclnwc + X h o l n w 0
+ Xhglnwg + Xhulnwu + Xhblnwh
+ S h r l n q  + 0hj (5.19f)
where 0\ j is the random error term which satisfies all 
ordinary least squares assumptions. . The subscript i indexes 
the energy input factor (wholesale power, coal, gas, oil, 
nuclear, or hydroelectric power), and j indexes the utility.
Neoclassical production assumptions require three sets 
of restrictions: symmetry, linearity in input prices, and 
constant returns to scale (homogeneity of degree one). In 
chapter 4, production and cost functions were shown to have 
symmetrical second-order bordered Hessian matrices. As a 
result, this symmetry also holds for the input demand 
functions, shown in equation (5.20).
X i j >
9k 1 01 k (5.20)
Likewise, the cost function is linear homogenous in 
prices. The summarized restrictions, and associated
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theoretical assumptions, as imposed on the estimated system, 
are shown in equation (5.21).
2 ai = 1  (CRTS)
2 tij = 0 (CRTS)
2 5ik = 0 (Symmetry) (5.21)
The factor share equations add to one because each is a 
percentage of total cost; therefore, constant terms must 
equal one to assure constant returns to scale at zero input 
levels.
In addition, constant returns to scale implies the sums 
of estimated parameters for outputs are equal to one; i.e., 
aggregated output is linear with regard to scale. Since the 
translog specification is expressed in logarithms, the 
parameters should sum to zero, as shown below.
2 J3ik = 0
2 0kl = 0
2 8 ik = 0 (5.22)
Elasticity of substitution estimates are made from 
parameter estimates. In chapter 5, the elasticity of 
substitution was shown to be
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cr(q,w) = (Ci * Cij)/(Ci * Cj ) (4.23)
where
Ci = 8C(q,w)/5wi (5.23a)
Ci j = 8C( q, w)/8wi 8wj (5.23b)
Berndt and Christensen (1973) developed a relationship 
between the cost function bordered Hessian, the parameter 
Ti j , and cost shares Si j :
<Ti i (q ,w ) = (Ci * Ci j )/(Ci * Cj )
= (Ti » + Si * - Si )/Si 2 (5.24)
where i is not equal to j. The relationship for elasticity 
of substitution described in chapter 4 (rewritten in 
translog model notation) is
CTi i (q,w) = (xii + Si 2 )/Si 2 (5.25a)
for i = j.
Oi j (q,w) = (xij + Si * Si )/Si * Sj (5.25b)
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for i = j. Similarly, the price elasticity of demand is 
given by
Ei i = 81n xi /51n Wj = Sj o\ j for all i,j. (5.26)
Elasticities will be calculated at the mean values of 
explanatory variables.
5.6 Using Regionally Pooled Data
Utilities in the research data set do not form a 
homogenous sample set, especially in terms of generation 
plant mix and fuel types. One conspicuous delineating 
characteristic is the geographic distribution of primary 
fuels: geologic formations containing fuels are spatially 
segregated, as is the regional infrastructure to transport 
them. The choice made by utility managers to select one 
energy source to the exclusion of another is influenced by 
regional disparities, but will be interpreted by the cost 
model (in the form specified by equation [5.19]) as 
deviations from optimizing behavior. The desire is to 
augment equation (5.19) with an explanation for apparent 
deviations from optimum behavior caused by regional 
disparities which capture part of the management decision 
process.
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Because ordinary least squares estimation techniques 
interpret deviations from cost-minimizing solutions as 
random errors in optimization, the estimation process must 
account for nonhomogeneity among utilities in different 
geographic regions. The concern is that unobserved 
management decisions will be measured by the error term, and 
those unobserved management actions will correlate with 
either dependent or independent variables, causing 
inconsistent or biased parameter estimates, or both. The 
following technique and rationale for making regional 
corrections in conditional demand functions follows the 
approach of Fuss (1977).
One method assumes differences resulting from regional 
variation imply that the parameters of demand functions 
specifically identify one region. This system uses regional 
intercepts. Fuss states that a second approach is to assume 
that regional effects are stochastic, so that error terms,
0i j , are composed of the regional component and an overall 
component. Two techniques for the second approach are the 
covariance estimators and the error components estimators 
methods. Covariance estimation is computationally 
equivalent to using specific regional intercepts as 
described in the first approach. Fuss cites Swamy and Arora 
(1972) who state that when the number of regions is less
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than 10, covariance estimation is the preferred method.
Using Fuss’s rationale, this research also corrects for
regional technological disparity by using the covariance 
estimation technique in its dummy variable form to explain 
deviation from optimal behavior. In this case, a typical 
element of the error term vector, 0i j , is interpreted as
0i j = Hi j k + ei j k (5.27)
where n is a dummy variable
i indexes fuel (w, c, g, o, n, and h)
j indexes the observation point (utility)
k indexes the region
e is the residual error term.
With regional dummy variables included, the aggregate 
share equations take the form:
S w j  — ( Gtw +  ©wj  k ) +  T w w l n W w  +  T w c  I n W c  +  Two I n W o
+ T w g l n W g  +  T w u l n W u  +  T w h l n W h
+ 8wrlnq + H w j k (5.28a)
Sc j  — ( Ctc +  6 c  j  k ) +  T e w  l n w w  +  T e c  I n W c  +  T c  o I n W o
+  T c g l n w g  +  T c u l n w u  +  t c b l n w h
+ 8c r lnq + Hi j k ( 5 . 28b)
+ To g l n w g + To U l n w u + To h I n W h
+ 8o r l n q + Mo j  k ( 5 . 2 8 c )
Sg j = ( a g + Gg j k ) + Tg w l n w w + Tg c l n w c + Tg o l n w 0
+ Tg g l n w g + Tg u l n w u + Tg h I n W h
+ 8g r l n q + Mg j k ( 5 . 2 8 d )
Su j = ( ctu + Gu i k ) + T u w l n W w + Tu c l n w c + T U O l n w 0
+ Tu g l n w g + Tu u l n w u + Tu h I n W h
+ 5u r l n q + Mo j  k ( 5 . 2 8 e )
S h j = ( ah + eh j k ) + T h w l n W w + T h e l n w c + Th o InWo
+ T h g l n w g + T h u l n w u + Th h I n W h
+ 8h r l n q + Mh j  k ( 5 . 2 8 f )
Seven regions, defined in chapter 3, are used in this 
model. To prevent deterministic relationships among 
independent variables, six regions are represented by 
regional variables pi through m , and region 7 is 
represented by the intercept term cti .
As presented in equation (5.28), symmetry is not 
imposed on the system, nor are the two homogeneity 
restrictions imposed. When regional variables are included, 
and symmetry, homogeneity, and constant returns to scale 
restrictions are omitted, equation (5.28) represents the 
fully specified model. Restrictions and model specification
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tests will be run against this fully-specified model.
5.7 Estimation Method
Equation (5.28) is estimated simultaneously using an 
iterative seemingly unrelated least squares (ITSUR) 
estimation utility of the SAS1/Econometric Time Series 
(SAS/ETS) software package. This section describes the 
ITSUR technique and associated assumptions. The SAS command 
file is presented in Appendix A.
Seemingly unrelated least squares uses correlation 
among error terms across equations to guarantee parametric 
estimator efficiency by iterating regressions to minimize 
the general least square function (SAS Institute, 1988).
Two basic OLS assumptions applicable to iterated seemingly 
unrelated regression are that errors are either 1) due to 
measurement errors in the dependent variable, or 2) errors 
in the specified relationship between the dependent variable 
and independent variables. Apart from assumptions about 
variable measurement and model specification are the four 
basic OLS assumptions that (1) the expected value of the 
error term is zero; (2) the error variance is equal to model 
variance; (3) error terms are serially uncorrelated; and (4)
1SAS is a registered trademark of the SAS Institute 
Inc., used to identify products or services of SAS Institute.
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covariance between the error term in each equation and 
dependent variables is zero. In addition, the explanatory 
variables must be uncorrelated; that is, there can be no 
deterministic relationship between them. Least squares 
estimators which meet all these criterion are called 
unbiased, and have minimum variance among the class of all 
linear unbiased estimators. Minimum-variance parameter 
estimators are called efficient.
Single-equation systems do not explain inter­
dependencies that may exist between dependent variables 
themselves or how independent variables relate to each 
other. For this reason, a six-equation model has been 
estimated for this research, to explain substitution 
relationships between the six energy sources. Errors in 
equations must be uncorrelated to independent variables in 
other equations, and possess unbiased errors (the expected 
value of error term is zero), and if these two conditions 
are not met, simultaneity between equations may occur. The 
most severe consequence of simultaneity is inconsistent 
parameter estimators.
Equations within a seemingly unrelated equation system 
may appear unrelated to one another, but may in fact be 
related through the error term. This is necessarily true 
when cost shares are estimated as in equation (5.28). Since
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the cost share for each commodity is determined by dividing 
the cost expended on that commodity by total cost, the cost 
shares for all equations sum to one, and the error terms for 
all equations must sum to zero. The ITSUR technique 
measures covariance between equation residuals, and uses 
this information to make subsequent parameter estimates.
Zellner (1962) suggests efficiency in estimation can be 
gained when the equation system is estimated as a single 
equation by generalized least squares using 1) the condition 
that cross equation error correlations sum to zero for every 
observation, and 2) information about cross-equation error 
term covariance. The first step in estimating equation
(5.28) is to regress each equation by OLS to obtain the 
error covariances between equations, and construct a 
covariance matrix. These first-stage residual variances and 
covariances are used as consistent estimators of error 
variances and covariances when the second-stage system 
regression is performed (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1981).
Shared cross-equation parameters, which occur when symmetry 
is imposed, are estimated with respect to the covariance 
matrix of the residuals across equations (SAS Institute, 
1988).
The system in equation (5.28) is estimated 
simultaneously because cross-equation restrictions are
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imposed to perform hypothesis tests. Off-diagonal elements 
of residual covariances are expected to be non-zero, (i.e., 
residuals are related) and estimates will be consistent if 
all explanatory variables are exogenous.
5.8 Tests On Hypothesis
The SAS Institute (1988) recommends testing maintained 
model hypotheses by measuring the change in the least- 
squares criterion function citing Gallant, (1987), and 
Gallant and Jorgenson (1979), who show that the difference 
between the full-model and reduced-model criterion function 
is equivalent to a chi-squared test. The test procedure has 
two stages. The model is estimated first using ITSUR, as 
specified in equation (5.28), from which the error 
covariance matrix is developed. This is the full-model 
specification. The regression is then performed a second 
time with restrictions imposed (hereafter referred to as the 
reduced-form specification), using the same error term 
covariance matrix developed for the full specification 
model. The test statistic is the SAS objective function 
(OBJECTIVE) statistic multiplied by the number of 
observations. Critical values are obtained from chi-squared 
tables for degrees of freedom equal to the number of imposed 
restrictions at the 0.95 confidence level. This method is
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used throughout the hypothesis-testing procedure described 
in chapter 7.
5.9 Data Description
Most data collected to study wholesale power demand 
behavior is ultimately derived from the FERC Form 1. All 
investor-owned utilities exceeding minimum retail power 
sales, sales-for-resale, interchange volume, and wheeling 
volume are required to file a Form 1. Some Form 1 data is 
summarized in the EIA/DOE publication Financial Statistics 
of Selected Electric Utilities. In 1987, the most recent 
FSSEU publication available, 279 private utilities 
representing 9% of the total number of electric utilities in 
the United States filed a Form 1 with the FERC. In the year 
data was collected for this study, 1987, these utilities 
supplied about 80% of all electricity sales to ultimate 
customers in 1987 (EIA/DOE, 1989a).
One hundred utilities were selected at random from the 
utilities reporting in FSSEU, and of these, 82 utilities 
reported all data elements required for regression analysis. 
Production by utilities in the data set represent about 40% 
of all electricity generated in the U.S. during 1987. 
Appendix B contains a listing of all relevant data sets used 
in this model.
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Table 5.1 lists the data sources for variables in the 
conditional input demand model described in the previous 
section. Some explanation of specific data series is 
necessary to understand how the data were collected, and 
what is being measured by the explanatory variables.
Wholesale Power Purchases: For a specific utility or
data point, wholesale power purchases are total wholesale 
power purchases and net interchanges reported on FERC Form 
1. Interchanges are transmission deliveries from other 
utilities transmitted through the purchasing utility. Net 
interchange means an algebraic sign is assigned to the 
difference between transmissions that come into the 
purchasing utility’s system and the transmissions that leave 
the utility’s system. If more interchanges leave the system 
than enter, the utility is a net seller. Purchased power 
includes purchases from other utilities, cooperatives, 
qualifying utilities, and municipals. There were no 
observations in the data set in which net interchange 
exceeded purchased power.
Wholesale Power Price: Price is determined by dividing
annual purchased power expense, reported in FSSEU, by total 
annual wholesale purchases and net interchange. The 
resulting price estimate is therefore an average price over 
all transactions for the year 1987.
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Wholesale Power Consumption Data
WHSL: Sum of Purchased
Power and Net
Transactions FERC Form 1
PWHSL: Wholesale Price FERC Form 1
Expenditures
Purchased Power Expense FSSEU
Nuclear Fuel Expense FSSEU
Hydroelectric Power Expense FSSEU
Fossil Fuel Expense FSSEU
Fuel cost data
PCOAL: Coal price paid at plants FERC Form 1
POIL: Oil " FERC Form 1
PGAS: Gas " FERC Form 1
PU308: Nuclear " " FERC Form 1
PHYDRO: Hydro generation costs FSSEU
Fuel Consumption Data
COAL: Coal quantity consumed FERC Form 1
OIL: Oil " FERC Form 1
G A S : Gas " FERC Form 1
U 3 0 8 : Nuclear " " FERC Form 1
HYDRO: Khw hydro power generated FERC Form 1
Total Demand Retail and Wholesale Demand FERC Form 1
Source: EIA/DOE, 1989, Financial Statistics for Selected
Utilities 1987, U.S Government Printing Office, Washington, 
D.C.
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Total Fuel Expense: Total fuel cost is the unit price
paid for each fuel times the quantity of each fuel consumed, 
summed over all fuels. Hydroelectric operating expense is 
used as a proxy price for fuel expense, since most utilities 
do not report a cost for water used. Cost shares are 
determined by dividing the expenditure on each individual 
fuel by total cost.
Coal. Gas. Oil, and Nuclear Prices: Total units
consumed at individual plants are reported on Form 1, as 
well as the average heat content (in terms of Btus per unit) 
and the cost per unit delivered. The entire consumption of 
each commodity by each utility is multiplied by the heat 
content for that fuel, and this value is divided into the 
total expenditure for that fuel. This results in an average 
fuel price per Btu weighted by heat content.
As shown in chapter 2, fuel cost is only a portion of 
total generation costs. A purchasing utility compares its 
generation cost to potential wholesale purchases, not the 
cost of the primary fuel used to generate the wholesale 
power. Because of thermal inefficiency, only about one 
third of energy burned for generation is actually converted 
to electricity, consequently, a Btu of electricity costs at 
least three times more than a Btu of fuel. To simulate the 
production frontier actually observed by a utility, and
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measure all fuel inputs on an equivalent basis, this study 
must either approximate generation cost or adjust power 
costs for mechanical inefficiency. The latter approach was 
taken. Wholesale power is sold in electric energy units 
(kilowatt hours) but prices in the model are specified in 
terms of dollars per million Btus, a mechanical energy 
measure, so all wholesale power sales are multiplied by a 
factor of 3,412 Btus per kwh. This is the energy required 
to generate the wholesale power sale for a generator 
operating at 100% efficiency, and to obtain price, this 
value is divided into total wholesale power expenditure.
The resultant is then multiplied by 0.3345, a typical 
efficiency factor for baseload generators (equal to 10,200 
Btus per kwh). This adjustment results in a normalized 
price which can be compared to other fuel costs in the 
model. Hydroelectric power costs have also been adjusted 
for thermal efficiency.
5.10 Specification and Tests: Conclusions
Chapter 4 presented assumptions regarding market and 
firm behavior pertinent to this research, and this chapter 
defined those assumptions in a mathematical form which would 
be convenient to estimate using multiple regression. The 
translog specification is robust for technologies where
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strict separability in inputs is not achieved. Industry 
practice suggests that electric utility input demand is not 
strictly separable, so the translog function is applicable 
in this situation. Cost share is interpreted as the 
equivalent of marginal cost for first-order cost-minimizing 
criteria. The next chapter records the results of the 
regression performed on the system defined in equation
(5.28), and also presents an evaluation of the estimates 





Electric utility behavior, economic theory, and 
mathematical form suggest a framework for empirical analysis 
in this research, including assumptions about cost 
functions, input substitution, and returns to scale. This 
framework is embodied in the functional form by the choice 
of explanatory and dependent variables and restrictions on 
functional form, resulting in the model’s maintained 
hypotheses. Tests are specified to verify that these 
maintained hypotheses and in addition, OLS assumptions are 
tested for validity.
Once theoretical and behavioral questions have been 
addressed, functional form is improved (in terms of 
conformance to economic behavior) by experimenting with 
different specifications. The criteria for evaluating any 
resulting specifications is that they 1) conform to economic 
theory and 2) explain the underlying technology as it exists 
in the utility industry.
6.2 Tests on Hypotheses and Functional Forms
In chapters 4 and 5, three maintained hypotheses were 
developed: 1) the adding-up criterion, 2) constant returns
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to scale (or homogeneity in prices), and 3) symmetry in the 
bordered Hessian matrix of the system demand equations.
These hypotheses are embodied in the analytical model as 
restrictions, repeated below (equation [5.21]).
2 ai = 1  (Adding-up restriction and CRTS)
2 Tij = 0 (Homogeneity and CRTS)
Si k = Ski (Symmetry)
The adding-up restriction is imposed as a result of 
using cost shares as the demand variable. Cost shares sum 
to one, and as a consequence, the intercepts for all six 
equations in equation (5.28) sum to one. Homogeneity is a 
test of the assumption of constant returns to scale. The 
translog function is analogous to the Cobb-Douglas 
representation in which constant returns to scale implies 
that exponents of the independent variables will sum to one, 
but the equivalent restriction when regressing logarithms is 
to have the parameters sum to zero. Symmetry is implied by 
the assumption that the utility cost functions are concave 
everywhere, i.e., always increasing, but at a decreasing 
ra t e .
These restrictions were arranged in nested forms and 
tested sequentially. First, all three restrictions were
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tested together, using an analytical equivalent to the F- 
test (described in chapter 5), using the test model as the 
fully-specified model with regional variables included, but 
no symmetry imposed. Second, pairs of jointly held 
assumptions were tested, and third, all three assumptions 
were tested individually. This resulted in seven models 
being tested, as shown in Table 6.1. The table presents 
restriction assemblages, number of restrictions (R), degrees 
of freedom required by each individual restriction and total 
degrees of freedom for the model, calculated chi-squared 
(X2 ) test statistics (calculated as described in chapter 5), 
critical chi-squared values, and whether or not the null 
hypothesis, H0 , was rejected. In this test, degrees of 
freedom is the number of imposed restrictions. All tests 
are performed at the 0.05 significance level. The joint 
hypotheses of homogeneity and symmetry, combination number 
4, is not rejected at the 0.05 significance level.
Besides jointly imposed homogeneity and symmetry, the 
other maintained hypothesis not rejected is the assumption 
of symmetry alone, model 7. Because the adding-up and 
homogeneity criteria are both necessary for acceptance of 
constant returns to scale, the remaining tests on OLS 
assumption will be performed using equation (5.28) with the 
hypothesis of symmetry alone maintained.
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Table 6.1 Maintained Hypothesis Test Results (0.05 Level)








19 216.0 30. 1 yes














18 21.0 28.9 no
5. Adding-up 1 1 very
large
3.8 yes
6. Homogeneity 6 6 353.0 12.6 yes
7. Symmetry 12 12 15.0 21.0 no
In this study, decreasing returns to scale associates
low costs with low expenditure shares and higher costs with
higher share, while increasing returns to scale associates
low expenditure share with high costs and high expenditure 
share with low costs. The failure to accept the adding-up 
restriction and homogeneity implies that homogeneity and 
constant returns to scale are not evident in short-run 
electric power production.
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6.2.1 OLS Assumption Tests
Acceptance of OLS assumptions 2 (explanatory variables 
are uncorrelated with error terms), 3 (error terms are 
serially uncorrelated), and 4 (dependent variables are 
uncorrelated with one another) is crucial for elasticity 
estimation, and especially to this research, because these 
three assumptions are most important for the quality of 
parameter estimates. Without these assumptions and their 
underlying implications intact, parameters cannot be 
accepted as valid estimates. Since the objective of this 
research is to estimate interfuel substitution, and 
elasticities of substitution are linear functions of 
parameter estimates, parameter validity is essential.
The failure to meet the second OLS assumption is a 
condition known as heteroskedasticity, which does not bias 
parameter estimators but will cause standard error under­
estimation. Anscombe (1961) and Ramsey (1969) describe a 
diagnostic test called RESET, which will give a weak 
indication of heteroskedasticity. The Anscombe/Ramsey tests 
both involve regressions of predicted values (raised to the 
first, second, and third powers) on the regression 
residuals. No heteroskedasticity was detected for coal, 
oil, and nuclear share equations, and the highest 
correlation coefficient for the gas, hydroelectric, and
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wholesale power share equations was 0.32. This low value of 
heteroskedasticity Is not considered damaging to the 
assumption of constant variance within an equation.
Serial correlation will also cause excessive but 
understated parameter estimate variance, invalidating 
Student-t tests for statistical significance. In addition, 
overall model variance will be underestimated, resulting in 
deceptively high goodness-of-fit diagnostics. The most 
common and convenient test for first order serial 
correlation is the Durbin-Watson D-statistic, a test of the 
hypothesis that in a regression of
ut = a + put - i ( 6 . 1 )
p is equal to zero, or that there is no first-order pattern 
to sequential error terms. The lower bound Durbin-Watson D- 
statistic critical value for a model with 82 observations 
and 7 explanatory variables extrapolates is approximately 
1.30, and an upper bound is 1.65. The hypothesis of 
autocorrelation is rejected for all but the gas and 
hydroelectric share equations, which both have D-statistics 
lying in the indeterminant region where no statement can be 
made about correlation. Durbin-Watson statistics are shown 
in the analysis of variance (ANOVA) results shown in Table
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6.2. The gas share and hydroelectric share equations are 
both in the indeterminant region.





Err SSE MSE Root MSE R 2 Adj-R2
Durbin
Watson
CS 11.5 70.5 4.6463 0.06591 0.25672 0.5095 0.4365 1.945
GS 11.5 70.5 0.7742 0.01098 0.10479 0.6185 0.5617 2.499
OS 11.5 70.5 1.8819 0.02669 0.16338 0.2828 0.1760 1.980
US 11.5 70.5 1.9703 0.02795 0.16718 0.1570 0.0314 2.128
HS 11.5 70.5 2.2837 0.03239 0.17998 0.2059 0.0876 1.622
WS 11.5 70.5 6.0954 0.08646 0.29404 0.3300 0.2302 1.891
Multicollinear data results in parameter estimates with 
large parameter variance, resulting in low estimate 
reliability. Multicollinearity may be caused by low 
variation in independent variables or high correlation 
between independent variables. A common test to determine 
multicollinearity is the Belsley, Welsh, and Kuh (1980) 
multicollinearity diagnostic condition number, defined as 
the square root of the largest to the smallest eigenvalue of 
the matrix X ’X of explanatory variables (Maddalla, 1988).
If the condition number is very large (i.e., many times 
greater than 30), the likelihood is that correlation exists 
between two or more explanatory variables. The SAS/ETS
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COLLIN diagnostic utility was used to test for 
multicollinearity. The wholesale price variable in the 
hydroelectric power equation and three output variables have 
condition numbers over 30, and all condition numbers for 
regional dummy variables are extremely high (acceptable for 
intercept terms).
The conclusions drawn from these tests are that 
heteroskedasticity, multicollinearity, serial correlation 
hypotheses are rejected for these data series and equations, 
consequently estimated parameters, associated standard 
errors, and t-test statistics are accepted as non-biased and 
valid. Any remaining inability to reject t-test null 
hypotheses is attributed to 1) a high level of data 
aggregation and 2) specification error.
6.2.2 Alternative Functional Forms
As noted in the data description section in chapter 5, 
because of the data collection technique, a utility which 
does not consume any quantity of a particular fuel exhibits 
a cost share of zero for that commodity, however, no price 
has been recorded by the utility. Consequently, if costs 
are recorded as zero and the share equation is solved with a 
zero cost for that commodity, zero cost shares will be 
statistically associated with zero commodity costs, an
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obvious violation of profit-maximization theory.
Ordinarily, if a commodity can be purchased at a zero cost, 
the consumer would demand the maximum amount of that 
commodity, i.e., continue to consume until the marginal 
productivity of the input is zero.
To avoid this statistical aberration, regional prices 
have been substituted for null commodity cost values to 
serve as cost approximations for prevailing fuel costs in 
each region. These proxy costs are the average regional 
costs presented in chapter 3. For example, the equations 
for all utilities which did not consume any coal in region 
3, the Midwest, were solved using the average coal cost for 
region 3 in 1987 ($1.58/MBtu) in place of the zero value 
contained in the data set. This is the proxy cost for coal
r
in region 3 and is identical for all utilities in region 3 
which did not consume coal. If the utility did consume 
coal, the equation is solved using the price observed for 
that utility. The proxy-cost model differs from equation 
5.28 only in that regional average prices are substituted 
for null energy cost values for coal, gas and oil.
The influence geographic location has upon fuel 
selection was tested by determining whether inclusion of 
regional dummy variables in the regression adds to 
regression quality. Regional variable inclusion was tested
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by the chi-squared test described in section 5.8 using 
equation (5.28) as the fully-specified model (with regional 
variables included), and the reduced-form model was equation
(5.28) (without regional variables). This procedure tests 
for differences in constant term effects across regions. 
Using the results of the maintained hypothesis tests, the 
four specifications were tested with jointly imposed 
homogeneity and symmetry, and symmetry alone. The results 
are shown in Table 6.3.
Table 6.3 Proxy-Cost Substitution and Functional Forms
Model





Homogeneity & Symmetry 18 21.0 28.3 no
Symmetry only 12 15.0 21.0 no
No Regional Variables
Homogeneity & Symmetry 18 57.0 28.9 yes
Symmetry only 12 51.0 21.0 yes
As shown, the homogeneity/symmetry models were 
eliminated in the previous section because CRTS was 
rejected. Therefore, the symmetry alone model with regional
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variables is retained. As a result, the proxy-cost model 
with regional dummy variables will be retained in the 
elasticity analysis.
6.2.3 Parameter Estimates
Parameter estimates are shown in Table 6.4. Complete 
regression results including t-statistics on parameter 
estimates are presented in Appendix C.
Table 6.4 Parameter Estimates
Coal Gas Oil U308 Hydro Wsale Sum
Coal 0.024 0.030 -0.010 0.067 0.011 -0.1222 0.00001
Gas 0.030 -0.069 -0.003 0.032 0.011 0.000 0.00001
Oil -0.010 -0.003 -0.098 0.085 0.026 0.000 0.00002
U308 0.067 0.032 0.0851 -0.150i 0.013 -0.0481 0.00001
Hydro 0.011 0.011 0.026 0.013 -0.036 -0.025 -0.00001
Wsale -0.122 0.000 0.000 -0.048 -0.025 0.1942 0.00000
N o t e : 1 Significant at the 0.05 level 
2 Significant at the 0.01 level
The sum of all parameters for each equation is shown 
under the Sum column, which indicates the direction and 
magnitude of returns to scale. If parameters of logarithms 
summed to zero, this would indicate constant returns to 
scale. The hydroelectric demand equation indicates 
decreasing returns to scale, while all others indicate
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increasing returns to scale, except for wholesale power 
which indicates constant returns to scale.
One disappointing feature of this analysis is that very 
few parameters are statistically significant at the 0.05 
acceptance level. However, there are conspicuous 
exceptions. Notably, wholesale power cost in the coal 
equation is significant at the 0.01 acceptance level. The 
nuclear fuel cost parameter in the oil equation and the oil 
price, in the nuclear fuel equation are both significant, and 
also the wholesale power cost parameter estimated in the 
nuclear power share equation.
Because heteroskedasticity, multicollinearity, and 
autocorrelation hypotheses were rejected, poor significance 
levels are attributed to data aggregation and specification 
error. The remaining price elasticity discussion will 
proceed despite low parameter significance, but all 
subsequent results and conclusions should be accompanied 
with a warning regarding regression quality and parameter 
significance.
6.3 Substitution and Price Elasticities
Substitution elasticity is interpreted as the 
percentage change in the ratio of quantity demanded in one 
fuel to quantity demanded in another, in response to a
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change in the price ratio (Binger and Hoffman, 1988). As 
shown in equations (5.24) and (5.25), these relationships 
show that substitution elasticity is a function of cost 
share, shown in Table 6.5. (Average prices and the number 
of utilities which consumed a portion of production from 
each commodity are also shown for reference.) The resulting 
elasticities of substitution shown in Table 6.6 show the 
percentage change in demand (measured in Btu) of the 
commodity symbolized by the first letter in response to a 
price change in the commodity represented by the second 
letter. Within the coal demand equation, coal cross-price 
elasticities indicate that coal demand is insensitive to 
price changes by other commodities, and only the coal cross­
price elasticity estimated for natural gas could even be 
considered economically significant.
Own-price elasticities in Table 6.7 are ranked in order 
of increasing price elasticity, showing that coal and 
wholesale power are largely insensitive to changes in their 
own prices. Cross-price elasticities are shown in Table 
6 . 8 .
Own-price elasticities in the proxy-cost model indicate 
that hydroelectric power and gas are moderately elastic, but 
oil and nuclear fuel are the most elastic of the six fuels. 
Oil elasticity is consistent with utility industry behavior
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Table 6.5 Average Factor Share Values and Energy 







Coal 0.3570 1. 56 57
Gas 0.0739 2.27 48
Oil 0.0782 3.94 62
U308 0.0594 0.80 25
Hydro 0.0562 0.29 42
Wholesale 0.3753 3.84 70
Total 1.0000
Table 6.6 Substitution Elasticities
Coal Gas Oil U308 Hydro Wsale





















































Table 6.8 Cross-Price Elasticities
E Estimate E Estimate
Ecg 0.17 Enc 0.28
Eco 0.10 Eng 0.59
Ecn 0.05 Eno 1.30
Ech 0.07 Enh 0.10
Ecw 0.08 Enw 0.28
Egc 0.82 Ehc 0.45
Ego 0.01 Ehg 0.24
Egn 0.47 Eho 0.49
Egh 0.19 Ehn 0.11
Egw 0.35 Ehw 0.43
Eoc 0.47 Ewe 0.08
Eog 0.01 Ewg 0.07
Eon 0.99 Ewo 0.09
Eoh 0.35 Ewn 0.04
Eow 0.43 Ewh 0.06
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since oil price deregulation, nonetheless, hydroelectric 
and nuclear fuel elasticities are inexplicably high, which 
seems inconsistent with hydroelectricity’s and nuclear 
fuel’s low cost and specialized technologies.
Although cross-elasticities are not generally 
categorized, for the purpose of this discussion, relative 
cross-elasticities are ranked in the same manner as own- 
price elasticities. Cross-price elasticities greater than 
one are referred to as elastic, elasticities between zero 
and one are inelastic, and negative elasticity indicates a 
complimentary relationships.
Ranking cross-price elasticities in order of increasing 
inelasticity again shows nuclear fuel to be among the most 
elastic, substituting with coal and wholesale power. The 
only elastic cross-price relationship is oil substitution 
for nuclear fuel. Nuclear fuel evidently substitutes for 
oil, and gas demand is also slightly sensitive to coal 
price. One of the most notable relationships indicated by 
the cross-elasticities shown in Table 6.9 is that coal and 
wholesale demand are relatively insensitive to price changes 
in each other despite the strong significance of wholesale 
cost in the coal equation.
The strong, apparently mutual relationship between oil 
and nuclear fuel demand is possibly influenced by
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Northeastern utilities which have restricted access to gas, 
but have a significant portion of U.S. oil-burning capacity, 
and also receives a large portion of generation from nuclear 
facilities. Gas and nuclear fuel substitution may occur in 
the Midwest, where nuclear generation and natural gas 
consumption are higher than average.
Table 6.9 Ranked Cross-Price Elasticities
E Estimate E Estimate E Estimate E Estimate
Eno 1.30
Eon 0.99 Eoh 0.35 Eco 0.10 Ecn 0.05
Egc 0.82 Egw 0.35 Enh 0.10 Ewn 0.04
Eng 0.59 Enw 0.28 Ewo 0.09 Ego 0.01
Eho 0.49 Enc 0.28 Ecw 0.08 Eog 0.01
Egn 0.47 Ehg 0.24 Ewe 0.08
Eoc 0.47 Egh 0.19 Ech 0.07
Ehc 0.45 Ecg 0.17 Ewg 0.07
Eow 0.43 Ehn 0.11 Ewh 0.06
Ehw 0.43
6.4 Comparison with Previous Studies
The results obtained from four previous studies are 
relevant to the present research because they measure 
interfuel substitution and also use translog input demand 
models. Other studies have examined fuel substitution with 
labor, structures, capital, and materials, but such
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aggregated studies do not provide much information about 
substitution between individual fuels.
Atkinson and Halvorsen (1976) modeled utility fuel 
substitution, evidence of scale economies, and separability 
of input demand by using a cross-sectional, three fuel input 
system of coal, oil, and natural gas. They measured 
consumption at individual plants, implying that each 
observation records consumption of a relatively small number 
of generating units. The assumption implied by measuring 
plant-level data is that the decision to substitute fuels 
occurs at the plant level. In fact, most utilities operate 
many plants with several units at each plant, meaning that a 
single management group controls a large number of 
generation units. Some of Atkinson and Halvorsen*s data 
points were plants which could not burn all three fuel 
types; in practice, fuel substitution opportunities for 
these plants were limited to fuels which would burn in the 
generators installed at the plant. For this reason,
Atkinson and Halvorsen broke the three inputs into a system 
of two-input models: coal-gas, coal-oil, and oil-gas. They 
concluded that steam electric generation is characterized by 
substantial fuel substitution, and strong scale economies 
were absent. The Atkinson-Halvorsen own- and cross-price 
elasticities are shown in Table 6.10.
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Table 6.10 Thesis Results and Comparison to Previous 
Research



















Ecc -0.47 -0.431 -1.15i -1.48 -0.82 -1.11 -1.01
Egg -1.84 -1.431 - 0.21 -1.30 - -0.52 -0.47
Eoo -2.25 - -1.501 -1.60 -1.30 - -0.44 -0.33
Enn -2.55 - - - - - - -
Ehh -1.71 - - - - - - -
Eww -0.34 - - - -0.74 -0.39 -0.51 -0.49
Ecg 0.17 0.09 _ _ 0.64 _ -1.34 -1.01
Eco 0.10 - 0.99i - 0.23 0.52 0.95 0.63
Ecn 0.05 - - - - - - -
Ech 0.07 - - - - - - -
Ecw 0.08 - - - 0.02 0.31 1.51 1.38
Egc 0.82 0.45i _ _ 0.76 _ -0.26 -0.20
Ego 0.01 - - 0.58i 0.11 - 0.10 0.04
Egn 0.47 - - - - - - -
Egh 0. 19 - - - - - - -
Egw 0.35 - - - -0.07 - 0.69 0.63
Eoc 0.47 _ 1.011 _ 0.24 0.15 0.26 0.17
Eog 0.01 - - 0.76i 0.09 -0.23 0.14 0.05
Eon 0.99 - - - - - - -
Eoh 0.35 - - - - - - -
Eow 0.43 - - - 0.19 0.08 0.04 0.11
Enc 0.28 _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Eng 0.59 - - - - - - -
Eno 1.30 - - - - - - -
Enh 0.10 - - - - - - -
Enw 0.28 - - - - - - -
Ehc 0.45 _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Ehg 0.24 - - - - - - -
Eho 0.49 - - - - - - —
Ehn 0.11 - - — - - - —




E Thesis AH 76 AH 76 AH 76 C 89 C 89
C-G C-0 O-G F 77 KL 88 xlog logit
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Ewe 0. 08 - - - 0.05 0.19 0.14 0.15
Ewg 0.07 - - - -0.18 - 0.34 0.32
Ewo 0.09 - - - - - - -
Ewn 0.04 - - - - - - -
Ewh 0.06 — — — 0.55 0.19 0.02 0.04
1 Significant at 0.05 level
Notes: A hyphen indicates that the elasticity was not 
estimated.
Electric power elasticities in previous studies represent 
electric substitution between fuels in the respective 
economy or sector.
AH 76: Atkinson and Halvorsen, 1976: Electric utility
interfuel substitution (cross-sectional data)
F 77: Fuss, 1977: Canadian manufacturing energy demand
submodel (time series)
KL 88: Kim, Labys, 1988: Korean manufacturing interfuel
substitution (time series)
C 89: Considine, 1989: U.S. Industrial interfuel
substitution (time series of translog (xlog) and 
logit models)
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Fuss (1977) modeled fossil fuel demand by the Canadian 
manufacturing sector and estimated price elasticities in 
four Canadian regions by estimating share equations with 
quarterly time series price data for six fuels: coal, liquid 
petroleum gas, fuel oil, natural gas, electricity and motor 
gasoline. This energy model was then used as an 
instrumental variable in an aggregated economic model of the 
Canadian manufacturing sector. Fuss's electricity price- 
elasticities represent, for the most part, retail electric 
power substitution with the other five fuels by the Canadian 
manufacturing sector, and are not directly comparable to 
results from the current research. Fuss found that 
substantial interfuel substitution could occur and as a 
partial consequence, large energy price increases could be 
absorbed with only a small output price increase in the 
manufacturing sector.
Kim and Labys (1988) studied energy substitution in a 
developing country, Korea. They modeled demand for coal, 
oil, and electricity in nine manufacturing and three non- 
manufacturing subsectors. The price elasticities presented 
in Table 6.10 for comparison are for the total Korean 
economy in 1978. Kim and Labys found that coal exhibited a 
relatively high own-price elasticity in several sectors, but 
is relatively inelastic in the aggregate economy. Coal and
T-4071 131
oil were found to be substitutes, and coal itself 
substituted for electricity in light manufacturing. Kim and 
Labys conclude that coal is capable of replacing oil and 
electricity in the industrial sector, oil and electricity 
are complements, and the magnitude of the own- and cross­
price elasticities indicate that fuels are strongly but not 
perfectly substitutable in existing industrial energy-using 
facilities. Policies that are intended to promote coal 
substitution for oil in order to alleviate Korean foreign 
exchange deficits would be ineffective and not significantly 
affect oil imports.
Considine (1989) compares translog demand-share to a 
logit demand-share specification in demand models for four 
energy types: petroleum, natural gas, steam coal, and 
electricity. Considine cites three reasons why previous 
studies using translog models yield incorrect signs in own- 
price elasticities. First, including energy material in 
petroleum and coal categories may aggregate the material and 
fuel markets in a way which can contribute to incorrect 
signs. Second, portions of the translog function may 
violate concavity assumptions. Third, natural gas 
regulation and partial prohibition of gas-burning facilities 
were found to influence U.S. industrial fuel demand. With 
regard to electric power elasticities, as with Fuss, and Kim
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and Labys, the electricity own-price and cross-price 
elasticities measure substitution with other primary fuels 
among industrial end-users.
Compared to the study results summarized above, this 
research’s elasticities indicate that coal demand is less 
sensitive to changes in its own price in the electric 
utility market than in domestic and foreign industrial 
sectors. Coal’s own-price elasticity estimated by the 
thesis research is nearest in scale to the Atkinson and 
Halvorsen coal own-price elasticity in their coal-gas model. 
The coal own-price elasticity from the Atkinson and 
Halvorsen coal-oil model is more elastic.
The estimate from the current research for natural gas 
elasticity is again nearest in magnitude to the Atkinson and 
Halvorsen coal-gas estimate. This indicates that the 
natural gas demand by electric utilities is more sensitive 
to price than Considine*s U.S. industrial demand estimate 
which indicates that industrial gas demand is relatively 
price inelastic. The same is true for oil, as both utility 
models, this thesis and Atkinson and Halvorsen’s, indicate 
that oil demand by utilities is more elastic than 
Considine’s industrial estimate. Nuclear and hydroelectric 
power elasticities were not estimated in any previous work 
surveyed for this research. The thesis results indicate
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that wholesale power is more inelastic within the electric 
utility market than retail electric power in either the 
Canadian, Korean, or U.S. industrial markets.
6.5 Conclusions from Empirical Results
Results from the foregoing analysis indicate that the 
symmetry assumption applies to the translog model of 
conditional demand equations for electric utilities, and 
also, regional dummy variables are valuable explanatory 
variables.
For the most part, regression parameter estimates are 
not statistically significant, but because OLS violations 
which most influence parameter estimate validity-- 
heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation, and multicollinearity 
--were absent, poor statistical significance is attributed 
to either data aggregation or incorrect model specification. 
Exceptions were wholesale price parameter in the coal and 
nuclear fuel share equations, nuclear fuel price in the oil 
share equation, and vice versa.
Despite the poor statistics, some conclusions may be 
inferred from the resulting own-price and cross-price 
elasticities.
1. Coal demand is largely insensitive to rising prices 
in competitive fuels, is own-price inelastic, and
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coal substitutes inelastically for natural gas and 
o i l .
2. Gas demand is most sensitive to coal and nuclear 
fuel prices, and natural gas substitutes for 
nuclear fuel. Electric utility gas demand is 
significantly more own-price sensitive in the 
utility market than in the industrial sector.
3. Oil demand is most sensitive to nuclear fuel price, 
and oil substitutes elastically with nuclear fuel. 
Although this phenomena is inconsistent with 
existing industry technology and practice, 
statistically, this relationship between oil and 
nuclear fuel is the strongest relationship in the 
entire study. This substitution probably occurs 
most in the Northeast region, where both oil and 
nuclear fuel intensity-of-use are highest. As with 
natural gas, oil is more own-price sensitive in the 
utility market than in the industrial sector.
4. Nuclear fuel demand is sensitive to oil price, and 
substitutes elastically with oil.
5. Wholesale power demand is insensitive to changes in 
its own price and primary fuel prices, but 





The objective of this research has been to estimate 
interfuel substitution by electric utilities and determine 
the impact of wholesale power sales on utility demand. 
Results from this research indicate that baseload fuels 
substitute for peakload fuels in overall utility markets, 
resulting in smoother aggregate load curves and lower 
operating costs by increasing baseload capacity load 
f actors.
7.1 Market Dynamics
The relationship between the six electricity energy 
sources is shown in Figure 7.1. The three combustible fuels 
(i.e., fuels whose prime movers exhibit some compatibility) 
are at the top of the diagram, with nuclear, hydroelectric, 
and wholesale power below. Generating expense increases to 
the right, leaving those fuels most suitable for baseload 
(coal and nuclear, and hydroelectric) to the left of gas, 
oil, and wholesale power.
Lines drawn between fuel symbols represent substitution 
occurring between those fuels and arrows indicate the 
direction of substitution. For instance, coal indicated a 







Figure 7.1 Cross-price Elasticities
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the coal symbol to the oil symbol. Only elasticities 
greater than 0.25 are shown to focus on the most important 
relationships.
There are three intertechnology (from thermal-to- 
nonthermal or conventional thermal-to-nuclear) 
substitutions: oil-nuclear, gas-nuclear, and oil-hydro. On 
a smaller scale, coal substitutes for nuclear generation. 
Wholesale power also substitutes for the four fuels involved 
in intertechnology substitution.
Summarizing, coal substitutes somewhat inelastically 
for all other fuels, wholesale power substitutes 
inelastically for all primary fuels, nuclear fuel 
substitutes elastically for oil and inelastically for gas. 
Intertechnology substitution, such as nuclear fuel 
substitution for oil or gas, can only be accomplished if 
wholesale power is available to consumers who do not possess 
all production technologies. All three intertechnology 
substitutions (nuclear and oil, nuclear and gas, and 
hydroelectric power and oil) are bilateral.
Substitution between oil and nuclear fuel is a typical 
intertechnology association for use as an example. Two 
circumstances exist in the oil-nuclear fuel substitution 
problem: 1) the utility observes higher than average oil 
costs and has both nuclear and oil-burning capacity, or 2) a
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utility which owns oil-fired capacity observes higher than 
average oil costs but operates no nuclear capacity. In the 
first case, the utility increases nuclear capacity to meet 
demand that would otherwise be supplied with oil-fired 
units, and in the second case, the utility purchases 
wholesale power when the wholesale price is lower than the 
decremental oil costs.
Statistically, a buyer*s increased wholesale power 
shares are associated with higher than average oil prices. 
Likewise, high nuclear fuel share will be statistically 
associated with high oil prices if the selling utility 
encounters the same prevailing oil costs. Over many data 
samples, using this logic, increased nuclear share will be 
associated with high oil prices, high oil prices will be 
associated with increased nuclear and wholesale power share. 
This result is consistent with what the model suggests has 
occurred.
7.2 Demand Curve Effects
Baseload fuel substitution for peak load fuels implies 
that baseload capacity displaces peakload capacity, which 
has the apparent effect of flattening aggregate demand 
curves. This is beneficial from an efficiency perspective, 
because flat demand curves are less expensive to satisfy
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than steeply sloped curves. As shown in chapter 2, flat 
load curves allow higher generator utilization rates, 
increasing generator load factors, which in turn influences 
baserate calculation and capital investment decisions.
Retail demand is not affected by the choice of 
wholesale power purchases, but such purchases excuse utility 
buyers from recruiting high-cost capacity to satisfy short­
term retail demand. The buyer’s peak load capacity is 
lowered by the amount of wholesale power purchased. Selling 
utilities increase their baseload by the amount of the sale. 
Off-peak capacity is elevated because large units neither 
pick up nor shed output rapidly. The net effect of 
wholesale power sales on aggregate demand curves, the sum of 
buyers’ and sellers’, in the with wholesale purchases, has a 
lower peak and higher "shoulders" than if all demand were 
met with self-generation.
7.3 Market Impact and Pricing Policy
The discussion in chapter 6 accepted with caution the 
thesis estimates as reasonable measures of demand elasticity 
direction and magnitude. These estimates may be used to 
estimate market response to price increase, and predict the 
effects of pricing policy by producers of electric utility 
fuels. Own-price elasticity of demand is interpreted as the
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percentage change in quantity demand for a given percentage 
change in price along the ordinary demand curve (Binger and 
Hoffman, 1988). Using this definition, the effect on 
electric utility demand caused by a one percent increase in 
price for the five energy commodities is shown in Table 7.1.














(87 M $ )
Coal 718 tons -0.47 -69.2 -3.4 tons -108
Gas 2.8 Tcf -1.84 -59.7 -51.4 Mmc f -144
Oil 337.8 bbls -2.25 -41.5 -7.6 bbls -187
U308 25.3 lbs -2.55 -128.6 -0.6 lbs -18
Wsale 337 Mwh -0.34 -3.9 -1.2 Mwh -15
Mmcf = million cubic feet
Source: Data derived from EIA/DOE, 1989, Annual Energy 
Review 1987 and State Energy Price and Expenditure Report 
1987♦ Washington D. C.: Government Printing Office.
Table 7.1 shows 1987 utility energy demand in 
respective units of delivery, estimated own-price 
elasticity, the market volume impact in Btus and delivery 
units, and the dollar value of the impacted demand. Prices 
are the average prices observed from the 82 utilities used 
in the thesis research data set. Oil demand is affected the
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most dramatically; the value of oil sales to utilities would 
fall about $187 million (about 5% of total sales to 
utilities) if oil prices rose one percent, compared to $144 
million in gas sales, $108 million in coal sales, $18 
million in uranium sales, and $5 million in wholesale power 
sales.
Cross-price market effects are given by cross-price 
elasticities, interpreted as the percentage change in input 
quantity demanded in response to a given percentage change 
in the price of another input. Cross-price market effects, 
measured in terms of market value and energy, are shown in 
Tables 7.2 and 7.3. The table convention is that a one 
percent increase in any commodity identified by a column 
heading will result in a dollar increase equal to the amount 
corresponding to the commodities identified in each row.
For example, if gas price increased one percent, the entire 
coal market value would increase $39 million, oil market 
value would increase $0.4 million, and so on.
Pricing policy is implied by marginal revenue analysis, 
after Binger and Hoffman (1988). Marginal revenue can be 
expressed in terms of elasticity as shown in equation 7.1.
MR(x) = p* (1 + 1/d i ) (7.1)
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Table 7.2 Market Value Impact on Electric Utility 
Commodities (1987 million dollars)
Coal Gas Oil U308 Wsale
Coal (108.2)i 39.0 23.8 10.8 18.2
Gas 72.7 (144.3) 0.5 41.9 31.4
Oil 34.2 0.4 (187.2) 71. 7 31.3
U308 11.4 23.7 52.4 (17.5) 11.4
Wsale 1.0 0.9 1.2 0.6 (15.0)
Table 7.3 Energy Impact on Electric Utility
Commodities (in millions of respec­
tive delivery units)
Coal Gas Oil U308 Wsale
Coal tons (3.4) 25.0 15.2 6.9 11.7
Gas Mmcf 26.6 (51.4) 0.2 15.3 11.5
Oil bbls 8.7 0.1 (7.6) 18.2 7.9
U308 lbs 14.2 29.6 65.5 (0.6) 14.3
Wsale Mwh 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 (1.1)
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In the elastic regions of the linear demand curve where 
marginal revenue increases, total revenue will increase in 
response to a price drop occurring as the result of an 
increase in production. Conversely, a price increase will 
result in a decrease in total revenue. Table 7.4 shows the 
marginal revenue resulting from a one percent price 
reduction.
Table 7.4 Marginal Revenue Analysis 
(Dollars per million Btu)
Ave MR
Commodity E Price (%)
Coal -0.47 1.56 -1.77
Gas -1.84 2.73 1.24
Oil -2.25 3.94 2.19
Nuclear -2.55 0.80 0.49
Wholesale -0.34 3.84 -7.35
Note: Prices are average prices taken from
Translog Model Data set
The implication for total revenue is that if marginal 
revenue is positive and prices rise, total revenue 
increases. Commodities with inelastic demand, such as coal 
and wholesale power, will lose total revenue as price falls 
even though supply and deliveries increase, and commodities 
with elastic demand, (gas, oil, and nuclear power) will
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increase total revenue although prices fall.
7.4 Suggestions for Future Research
This research could be expanded by either of two 
approaches. To increase the depth of analysis and resolve 
inconclusive relationships, the data size should be enlarged 
so that individual regions may be analyzed independently. 
Perhaps this could be done by pooling time series data with 
the existing cross-sectional data format. Multiple-output 
technologies could be modeled to estimate elasticity of 
supply. Time-of-use, and demand-curve data, if available, 
would reveal more about the impact of demand characteristics 
on load curve substitution.
On the other hand, rather than increasing the level of 
detail, this research could be combined, possibly as an 
instrumental variable, in a comprehensive, multiple-sector 
analysis of United States energy demand. However, macro- 
economic research would also benefit from a larger data 
sample.
Other research topics, such as policy analysis, could 
be studied by verifying fundamental economic assumptions, 
(i.e., cost-minimization, profit-maximization, etc.) by 
comparing utility industry historical performance with 
analytical solutions (such as dynamic programming
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techniques) to the cost-minimization problem.
Finally, the success of this research may indicate that 
the transcendental logarithmic function analytical 
technique, despite its acknowledged shortcomings regarding 
global nonconcavity, holds promise for analyzing other 
disaggregated inputs to production, capital and labor, and 
might be a useful way to analyze disaggregated consumer 
durables and nondurables in nonenergy market analysis.
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data t c )
infile ' t c .dat *;
input no region t c ;
data share; 
infile 'share.dat’; 
input cs gs os us hs ws;
data co s t ; 
infile 'cost.dat*;
input coal_c gas_c oil_c u3o8_c hydro_c wsale_c;
data output (replace = y e s ); 
infile 'output.dat'; 
input wsale_q rsale_q tot_q;
data xlog; 
merge share cost output tc;
/* logrithms are undefined at 0.0 */
if coal_c <= 0.0 then lcc = 0.000001; 
else lcc = log(coal_c);
if gas_c <= 0.0 then lgc = 0.000001; 
else lgc = log(gas_c);
if oil_c <= 0.0 then loc = 0.000001; 
else loc = log(oil_c);
if u3o8_c <= 0.0 then Inc = 0.000001; 
else Inc = log(u3o8_c);
if hydro_c <= 0.0 then lhc = 0.000001; 
else lhc = log(hydro_c);
if wsale_c <= 0.0 then lwc = 0.000001; 
else lwc = log(wsale_c);
if tot_q <= 0.0 then ltot_q = 0.000001; 
else lq = log(tot_q);
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/* Regional proxy prices are commented out 
*/
if coal_c <= 0.00 & region = 1 then lcc = 0.5365
if gas_c <= 0.00 & region = 1 then lgc = 1.6409
if oil_c <= 0.00 & region = 1 then loc = 1.7630
if u3o8_c <= 0.0 then Inc = -0.2231 ; 
if wsale_c <= 0.0 then lwc = 1.3455;
if coal_c <= 0.00 & region = 2 then lcc = 0.5539;
if gas_c <= 0.00 & region = 2 then lgc = 1.4748;
if oil_c <= 0.00 & region = 2 then loc = 1.8181;
if coal_c <= 0.00 & region = 3 then lcc = 0.4574
if gas_c <= 0.00 & region = 3 then lgc = 1.5129
if oil_c <= 0.00 & region = 3 then loc = 1.8610
if coal_c < = 0.00 & region = 4 then lcc = 0.3001;
if gas_c < = 0.00 & region = 4 then lgc = 1.3737;
if oil_c < = 0.00 & region = 4 then loc = 1.8779;
if coal_c <= 0.00 & region = 5 then lcc = 0.4447;
if gas_c <= 0.00 & region = 5 then lgc = 0.8502;
if oil_c <= 0.00 & region = 5 then loc = 1.6487;
if coal_c <= 0.00 & region = 6 then lcc = 0.1044;
if gas_c <= 0.00 & region = 6 then lgc = 1.4207;
if oil_c <= 0.00 & region = 6 then loc = 1.8594;
if coal_c <= 0.00 & region = 7 then lcc = 0.4886;
if gas_c < = 0.00 & region = 7 then lgc = 1.2754;
if oil_c <= 0.00 & region = 7 then loc = 1.7681;
/* region dummy variable assignment matrix */
if region = 1 then dll = lcc; 
else dll = 0.0;
if region = 1 then dl2 = lgc; 
else dl2 = 0.0;
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if region = 1 then dl3 
else dl3 = 0.0;
if region = 1 then dl4 
else dl4 = 0.0;
if region = 1 then dl5 
else dl5 = 0.0;
if region = 1 then dl6 
else dl6 = 0.0;
if region = 1 then dl7 
else dl7 = 0.0;
if region = 2 then d21 
else d21 = 0.0;
if region = 2 then d22 
else d22 = 0.0;
if region = 2 then d23 
else d23 = 0.0;
if region = 2 then d24 
else d24 = 0.0;
if region = 2 then d25 
else d25 = 0.0;
if region = 2 then d26 
else d26 = 0.0;
if region = 2 then d27 
else d27 = 0.0;
if region = 3 then d31 
else d31 = 0.0;
if region = 3 then d32 
else d32 = 0.0;
if region = 3 then d33 













l c c ; 
l g c ; 
lo c ;
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if region = 3 then d34 
else d.34 = 0.0;
if region = 3 then d35 
else d35 = 0.0;
if region = 3 then d36 
else d36 = 0.0;
if region = 3 then d37 
else d37 = 0.0;
if region = 4 then d41 
else d41 = 0.0;
if region = 4 then d42 
else d42 = 0.0;
if region = 4 then d43 
else d43 = 0.0;
if region = 4 then d44 
else d44 = 0.0;
if region = 4 then d45 
else d45 = 0.0;
if region = 4 then d46 
else d46 = 0.0;
if region = 4 then d47 
else d47 = 0.0;
if region = 5 then d51 
else d51 = 0.0;
if region = 5 then d52 
else d52 = 0.0;
if region = 5 then d53 
else d53 = 0.0;
if region = 5 then d54 
else d54 = 0.0;
I n c ; 
l h c ; 
l w c ; 
ltot_q;
l c c ; 
lg c ; 
l o c ;
I n c ; 
l h c ; 
l w c ; 
ltot_q;
l c c ; 
l g c ; 
l o c ;
I n c ;
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if region = 5 then d55 = lhc; 
else d55 = 0.0;
if region = 5 then d56 = lwc; 
else d56 = 0.0;
if region = 5 then d57 = ltot_q; 
else d57 = 0.0;
if region = 6 then d61 = lcc; 
else d61 = 0.0;
if region = 6 then d62 = lgc; 
else d62 = 0.0;
if region = 6 then d63 = loc; 
else d63 = 0.0;
if region = 6 then d64 = Inc; 
else d64 = 0.0;
if region = 6 then d65 = lhc; 
else d65 = 0.0;
if region = 6 then d66 = lwc; 
else d66 = 0.0;
if region = 6 then d67 = ltot_q; 
else d67 = 0.0;
if region = 7 then d71 = lcc; 
else d71 = 0.0;
if region = 7 then d72 = lgc; 
else d72 = 0.0;
if region = 7 then d73 = loc; 
else d73 = 0.0;
if region = 7 then d74 = Inc; 
else d74 = 0.0;
if region = 7 then d75 = lhc; 
else d75 = 0.0;
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if region 7 then d7 6 = lwc
else d76 = 0. 0;
if region — 7 then d7 7 = lto
else d77 = 0. o;
if region - 1 then regl z 1;
if region z 2 then reg2 — 1;
if region = 3 then reg3 z 1;
if region r 4 then reg4 z 1;
if region - 5 then reg5 - 1;
if region = 6 then reg6 =
if region = 7 then reg7 = 1;
if region z 1 then reg2 z 0;
if region z 1 then reg3 z 0;
if region = 1 then reg4 z 0;
if region z 1 then reg5 z 0;
if region = 1 then reg6 z 0;
if region = 1 then reg7 z 0;
if region - 2 then regl - 0;
if region = 2 then reg3 z 0;
if region z 2 then reg4 z 0;
if region z 2 then reg5 z 0;
if region — 2 then reg6 = 0;
if region z 2 then reg7 z 0;
if region — 3 then regl z 0;
if region z 3 then reg2 z 0;
if region — 3 then reg4 z 0;
if region — 3 then reg5 - 0;
if region — 3 then reg6 z 0;
if region z 3 then reg7 z 0;
if region z 4 then regl z 0;
if region = 4 then reg2 z 0;
if region Z 4 then reg3 z 0;
if region — 4 then reg5 z 0;
if region = 4 then reg6 z 0;
if region = 4 then reg7 = 0;
if region — 5 then regl z 0;
if region — 5 then reg2 z 0;
if region z 5 then reg3 z 0;
if region = 5 then reg4 z 0;
if region z 5 then reg6 = 0;
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if region = 5 then reg7 o;
if region 6 then regl = 0
if region 6 then reg2 0
if region = 6 then reg3 - 0
if region r 6 then reg4 = 0
if region = 6 then reg5 r 0
if region — 6 then reg7 — 0
if region — 7 then regl - 0
if region = 7 then reg2 = 0
if region r 7 then reg3 0
if region — 7 then reg4 - 0
if region — 7 then reg5 = 0





























coal_s jgas_is oil_s iu3o8__s hydro
*/
/* these variables are used in the cost model only */
cc = 0.5 X lcc * lcc;
eg 0.5 X lcc * l g c ;
C O — 0.5 * lcc * loc;
cn — 0.5 * lcc * I n c ;
ch ~ 0.5 * lcc * l h c ;
cw - 0.5 * lcc X lwc;
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gg = 0.5 * lgc x l g c ;
go 0.5 * lgc * l o c ;
gn - 0.5 * lgc x I n c ;
gh 0.5 * lgc x l h c ;
gw = 0.5 * lgc X l w c ;
oo 0.5 X loc X l o c ;
on - 0.5 * loc X I nc;
oh 0.5 * loc X l hc;
ow — 0.5 * loc X l w c ;
nn 0.5 * Inc X I n c ;
nh = 0.5 * Inc X l h c ;
nw — 0.5 * Inc X l w c ;
hh = 0.5 * lhc X lhc;
hw = 0.5 X Inc X l w c ;
ww = 0.5 X lwc X l w c ;
qc lq * l c c ;
qg = lq * l g c ;
qo = lq * l o c ;
qn r lq X I n c ;
qh = lq * l h c ;
qw = lq * l w c ;
lqsqr r lq * iq;
/* Cost Model
cost: model = lcc lgc loc Inc lhc lwc lq
cc eg co cn ch cw 
gg go gn gh gw 
oo on oh ow 
nn nh nw 
hh hw 
ww
qc qg qo qn qh qw lqsqr/dw; */
titlel * Unrestricted Additive and Symmetry*; 
proc model data = xlog;
var cs gs os us hs w s ;
parms al a2 a3 a4 a5 a6
bll bl2 bl 3 bl4 bl5 bl6 bl7
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b 2 1 b22 b23 b24 b25 b26 b27
b 3 1 b32 b33 b34 b35 b36 b37
b 4 1 b42 b43 b44 b45 b46 b47
b 5 1 b52 b53 b54 b55 b56 b57
b 6 1 b62 b63 b64 b65 b66 b67
r 11 rl2 r 13 rl4 r 15 rl6
r21 r22 r23 r24 r25 r26
r31 r32 r33 r34 r35 r36
r41 r42 r43 r44 r45 r46
r51 r52 r53 r54 r55 r56
r61 r62 r63 r64 r65 r 6 6 ;
cs = al + bll*lcc + bl2*lgc + bl3*loc
+ bl4*lnc + bl5*lhc + bl6*lwc + bl7*lq
+ rll*regl + rl2*reg2 + rl3*reg3
+ rl4*reg4 + rl5*reg5 + rl6*reg6;
gs = a2 + b21*lcc + b22*lgc + b23*loc
+ b24*lnc + b25*lhc + b26*lwc + b27*lq
+ r21*regl + r22*reg2 + r23*reg3
+ r24*reg4 + r25*reg5 + r26*reg6;
os = a3 + b31*lcc + b32*lgc + b33*loc
+ b34*lnc + b35*lhc + b36*lwc + b37*lq
+ r31*regl + r32*reg2 + r33*reg3
+ r34*reg4 + r35*reg5 + r36*reg6;
us = a4 + b41*lcc + b42*lgc + b43*loc
+ b44*lnc + b45*lhc + b46*lwc + b47*lq
+ r41*regl + r42*reg2 + r43*reg3
+ r44*reg4 + r45*reg5 + r46*reg6;
hs = a5 + b51*lcc + b52*lgc + b53*loc
+ b54*lnc + b55*lhc + b56*lwc + b57*lq
+ r51*regl + r52*reg2 + r53*reg3
+ r54*reg4 + r55#reg5 + r56*reg6;
ws = a6 + b61*lcc + b62*lgc + b63*loc
+ b64*lnc + b65*lhc + b66*lwc + b67*lq
+ r61*regl + r62*reg2 + r63*reg3
+ r64*reg4 + r65*reg5 + r66*reg6;
fit cs gs os us hs ws/outsused = unrstcov itsur dw;
r u n ;
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titlel ’Additive and symmetry’; 





var cs gs os us hs w s ;
parms al a2 a3 a4 a5 a6
bll bl2 bl3 bl 4 bl5 bl6 bl 7
bll bl2 bl3 bl 4 bl5 bl6 bl 7
b22 b23 b24 b25 b26 b27
b33 b34 b35 b36 b37
b44 b45 b46 b47
b55 b56 b57
b66 b6 7
r 11 rl2 r 13 rl4 rl5 rl6
r21 r22 r23 r24 r25 r26
r3 1 r32 r33 r34 r35 r36
r41 r42 r43 r44 r45 r46
r51 r52 r53 r54 r55 r56
r61 r62 r63 r64 r65 r66
additive restriction */
al = 1.0 - a2 - a3 - a4 - a5 - a 6 ;
homogeneity restriction */
bll = 0.0 - bl2 - bl3 - bl4 - bl5 - bl6 - bl 7
b2 2 = 0.0 - bl2 - b23 - b24 - b25 - b26 - b27
b33 = 0.0 - bl3 - b23 - b34 - b35 - b36 - b37
b4 4 = 0.0 - bl4 - b24 - b34 - b45 - b46 - b47
b5 5 = 0.0 - bl5 - b25 - b35 - b45 - b56 - b57
b66 = 0.0 - bl6 - b26 - b36 - b46 - b56 - b67
*/
/* symmetry restriction formulated by equation structure */
cs = al + bll*lcc + bl2*lgc + bl3*loc
+ bl4*lnc + bl5*lhc + bl6*lwc + bl7*lq
+ rll#regl + rl2*reg2 + rl3*reg3
+ rl4*reg4 + rl5*reg5 + rl6*reg6;
gs = a2 + bl2*lcc + b22*lgc + b23*loc
+ b24*lnc + b25*lhc + b26*lwc + b27*lq
+ r21*regl + r22*reg2 + r23*reg3
+ r24*reg4 + r25*reg5 + r26*reg6;
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os = a3 + bl3*lcc + b23*lgc + b33*loc
+ b34*lnc + b35*lhc + b36*lwc + b37*lq
+ r31*regl + r32*reg2 + r33*reg3
+ r34*reg4 + r35*reg5 + r36*reg6;
us = a4 + bl4*lcc + b24*lgc + b34*loc
+ b44*lnc + b45*lhc + b46*lwc + b47*lq
+ r41*regl + r42*reg2 + r43*reg3
+ r44*reg4 + r45*reg5 + r46*reg6;
hs = a5 + bl5*lcc + b25*lgc + b35*loc
+ b45*lnc + b55*lhc + b56*lwc + b57*lq
+ r51*regl + r52*reg2 + r53*reg3
+ r54*reg4 + r55*reg5 + r56*reg6;
ws = a6 + bl6*lcc + b26*lgc + b36*loc
+ b46*lnc + b56*lhc + b66*lwc + b67*lq
+ r61*regl + r62*reg2 + r63*reg3
+ r64*reg4 + r65*reg5 + r66*reg6;
fit cs gs os us hs ws/sdata = unrstcov itsur dw;




Table B.l Electric Utilities and Regions of Operation
Data Region
No. Name (Legal Business Name) No.
1 AEP Generating Co 3
/'Z Appalachian Power Co 2
3 Arizona Public Service Co AZ 6
4 Baltimore Gas and Electric Co 2
5 Bangor Hydro Electric Co 1
Blackstone Valley Electric Co 2
4 7  Cambridge Electric Light Co MA 1
8 Canal Electric Co MA 1
9 Central Hudson Gas and Elect Corp 1
4.0 Central Illinois Light Co 3
11 Central Power and Light Co TX 5
.4 2 Cincinnati Gas and Electric Co OH 3
13 Commonwealth Edison Company IL 3
14 Commonwealth Edison of Indiana IN 3
"15 Commonwealth Electric Co 1
16 Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co 1
17 Consolidated Edison Co of New York 1
4 8  Consolidated Water Power Co 4
,4 9 Consumers Power Co MI 3
4 0  Duke Power Co NC 2
4 1  Edison Sault Electric Company MI 3
4 2  El Paso Electric Co 5
23 Florida Power and Light Co FL 3
4 4  Green Mountain Power Corp VT 1
25 Houston Lighting and Power Co TX 5
"26 Idaho Power Co 6
"27 Illinois Power Co 3
"28 Indianapolis Power and Light Co 3
29 Indiana-Kentucky Electric Corp OH 3
30 Iowa Electric Light and Power Co 10 4
31 James River NH Electric Inc NH 1
32 Jersey Central Power and Light Co 1





No. Name (Legal Business Name) No.
34 Long Island Lighting Co 1
35 Louisville Gas And Electric Co 3
36 Madison Gas and Electric Co WI 4
37 Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co MA 1
38 Maui Electric Co HI 7
39 Metropolitan Edison Co PA 3
40 Minnesota Power and Light Co 4
41 Mississippi Power and Light Co MI 3
42 Montana Power Co MT 6
43 Montaup Electric Co MA 1
44 Narragansett Electric Co 1
4 5 Nevada Power Co NV 7
46 New England Power Co 1
47 New Orleans Public Service Co 5
48 Northern Indiana Pub Serv Co IN 3
49 Northern States Power Co SD 4
50 Northwestern Public Service Co SD 4
51 Northwestern Wisconsin Electric Co 4
52 Ohio Power Co 3
53 Ohio Valley Electric Corp OH 3
54 Oklahoma Gas and Electric Co OK 5
55 Orange and Rockland Utilities 1
56 Otter Tail Power Co 7
57 Pacificorp OR 7
58 Pennsylvania Power Co PA 3
59 Philadelphia Electric Co PA 3
60 Potomac Edison Co MD 2
^61 Public Service Co Of NH 1
62 Public Service Co of Oklahoma OK 5
63 Rochester Gas and Electric Co 1
*̂64 Safe Harbor Water Power Corp 3
65 South Beloit Water Gas and Elect Co 4
66 Southeastern Electric Power Co LA 5
^67 Southern California Edison Co 7
68 Southwestern Electric Service Co 5





No. Name (Legal Business Name) No.
7 0 Superior Water, Light and Power Co 4
71 Susquehanna Electric Co PA 3
72 Tapoco, Incorporated 3
73 The Empire District Electric Co MO 4
74 Toledo Edison Co TN 3
75 Tuscon Electric Co 6
76 UGI Corporation PA 3
77 Union Electric Co MO 4
78 Union Light, Heat and Power Co KY 4
79 Utah Power and Light Co UT 6
•80 UtiliCorp MO 4
81 Warm Springs Power Enterprises 7
82 West Texas Utilities Co TX 5
83 Wisconsin Electric Power Co WI 4
84 Western Massachusetts Elect Power 1
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0.7833 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.0102 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.2065
2 0.7333 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.0053 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.0026 0.2587
3 0.4836 0.0153 0.0843 0.0512 0.0008 0.3648
4 0.4585 0.0376 0.1332 0.1613 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.2094
5 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.1449 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.0214 0.8338
6 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.0001 0.9999
7 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.1914 0.0689 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.7397
8 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.9545 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.0455
9 0.1433 0.1182 0.5287 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.0082 0.2016
10 0.9964 0.0006 0.0031 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0
11 0.2827 0.6695 0.0013 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.0040 0.0425
12 0.9870 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.0081 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.0049
13 0.5016 0.0013 0.0677 0.2500 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.1795
14 1 .0 0 00 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0
15 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.0276 0.0154 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.9570
16 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 1.0000 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0
17 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.2604 0.3424 0.0158 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.3814
18 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.0274 0.9726
19 0.5443 0.0011 0.0175 0.0410 0.0041 0.3919
20 0.2964 0.0004 0.0111 0.1650 0.0060 0.5211
21 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.0853 0.9147
22 0.0985 0.4687 0.0002 0.2752 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.1575
23 0.0074 0.2259 0.2262 0.0150 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.5256
24 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.0203 0.0323 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.0248 0.9226
25 0.3705 0.3362 0.0179 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.2755
26 0.6135 0.0002 0.0053 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.0987 0.2824
27 0.7919 0.0038 0.1273 0.0764 0.0006 0 . 0 0 0 0
28 0.9925 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.0075 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0
29 1.0000 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0
30 0.4018 0.0119 0.0049 0.1291 0.0007 0.4517
31 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.0369 0.9631
32 0.0526 0.1283 0.0411 0.0735 0.0005 0.7040
33 0.5245 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.0056 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.4699
34 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.1421 0.7026 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.1553
35 0.9874 0.0006 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.0111 0.0009
36 0.7251 0.0736 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.0975 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.1037
37 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 1.0000 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0



















39 0.5172 0.0112 0.0159 0.0900 0.0000 0.3658
40 0.5490 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0087 0.4424
41 0.1153 0.1697 0.0095 0.0000 0.0000 0.7056
42 0.3639 0.0053 0.0000 0.0000 0.1296 0.5011
43 0.0000 0.0000 0.3791 0.0148 0.0000 0.6061
44 0.0000 0.0663 0.0685 0.0000 0.0000 0.8652
45 0.5748 0.0515 0.0086 0.0000 0.0000 0.3650
46 0.3007 0.0000 0.2505 0.0000 0.0083 0.4406
47 0.0000 0.1981 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.8018
48 0.7542 0.0081 0.0028 0.0000 0.0005 0.2344
49 0.6491 0.0073 0.0042 0.1401 0.0030 0.1964
50 0.6000 0.0037 0.0103 0.0000 0.0000 0.3860
51 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0321 0.9679
52 0.9932 0.0000 0.0062 0.0000 0.0007 0.0000
53 0.4297 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.5703
54 0.4158 0.5750 0.0007 0.0000 0.0000 0.0085
55 0.1105 0.3160 0.0594 0.0000 0.0281 0.4860
56 0.2634 0.0000 0.0056 0.0000 0.0009 0.7301
57 0.7883 0.0000 0.0053 0.0000 0.0172 0.1893
58 0.9189 0.0000 0.0111 0.0000 0.0000 0.0700
59 0.1823 0.0061 0.1497 0.1579 0.0363 0.4676
60 0.5368 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0012 0.4621
61 0.2851 0.0000 0.2712 0.0073 0.0047 0.4317
62 0.2823 0.6713 0.0006 0.0000 0.0000 0.0457
63 0.3183 0.0027 0.1419 0.2339 0.0111 0.2921
64 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000
65 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0118 0.9882
66 0.4884 0.1048 0.3685 0.0000 0.0000 0.0383
67 0.0600 0.3799 0.0264 0.0976 0.0055 0.4305
68 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
69 0.5875 0.0468 0.0466 0.0000 0.0000 0.3191
70 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
71 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0 .0 0 00
72 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000
73 0.4118 0.0078 0.0022 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.0047 0.5735
74 0.8042 0.0012 0.0043 0.1903 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0
75 0.1905 0.0307 0.0030 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.7758


















77 0.8819 0.0045 0.0121 0.0798 0.0083 0.0134
78 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
79 0.9211 0.0020 0.0047 0.0000 0.0146 0.0576
80 0.5551 0.0057 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.4389
81 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000
82 0.3169 0.5914 0.0165 0.0000 0.0000 0.0753
83 0.7859 0.0069 0.0058 0.1639 0.0055 0.0320
84 0.0000 0.1950 0.2797 0.4664 0.0588 0.0000
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1 2.0311 0.0000 3.8349 0.0000 0.0000 2.2356
2 1.6707 0.0000 4.2310 0.0000 0.1670 2.4605
3 1.1371 3.1349 8.5955 0.3116 0.5569 8.5602
4 1.5752 2.6368 3.0444 0.4923 0.0000 2.8643
5 0.0000 0.0000 3.2243 0.0000 0.5085 3.8822
6 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3214 6.1894
7 0 . 0 0 0 0 2.8957 3.1282 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 4.2402
8 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 2.7819 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 8.0187
9 1.9696 2.4841 2.9341 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.6605 2.1666
10 1.9275 4.3515 3.8526 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0
11 2.0454 2.0768 3.5840 0 . 0 0 0 0 2.1457 1.4456
12 1.6397 0 . 0 0 0 0 4.1411 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 20.3985
13 2.8590 4.9913 4.1590 0.6141 0.0038 3.3579
14 3.0113 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0
15 0 . 0 0 0 0 2.7200 2.8584 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 4.9562
16 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.9295 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0
17 0 . 0 0 0 0 3.0155 3.2474 0.2992 0 . 0 0 0 0 2.9805
18 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.7534 3.5073
19 1.8382 5.6299 2.9539 0.6880 0.1496 2.1958
20 1.8120 2.9458 4.1412 0.4777 0.2711 6.3335
21 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.5363 2.3728
22 1.0255 1.9049 7.2533 0.9613 0 . 0 0 0 0 1.6073
23 1.6400 2.7024 2.8343 0.6059 0 . 0 0 0 0 4.1446
24 0 . 0 0 0 0 2.5571 3.8000 0 . 0 0 0 0 1.4571 3.8622
25 2.1285 1.7396 14.3081 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 3.7472
26 1.2190 4.6229 4.1508 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.1492 3.0312
27 1.4698 1.8141 4.2510 4.4496 1.9035 0 . 0 0 0 0
28 1.1890 0 . 0 0 0 0 3.9736 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0
29 1.0933 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0
30 1.3223 2.3717 4.0184 0.7320 1.5335 4.5334
31 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.4423 24.0372
32 1.2674 2.6143 3.5762 0.7141 0.0134 3.5617
33 1.4506 0 . 0 0 0 0 4.0228 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 4.9761
34 0 . 0 0 0 0 2.5700 3.3728 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 2.9633
35 1.3781 2.5665 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.3402 0.2092
36 1.5981 4.0294 3.3848 0.4103 0 . 0 0 0 0 1.8999

















38 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.0000 3.3787 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
39 1.6710 2.7149 4.1448 0.5227 0 . 0 0 0 0 2.3867
40 1.4255 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.2334 2.0773
41 1.6892 1.9229 2.7116 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 4.0464
42 0.6176 0.8904 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.3957 4.0859
43 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 2.7788 0.7890 0 . 0 0 0 0 6.4296
44 0 . 0 0 0 0 2.3104 2.5912 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 4.4694
45 1.6318 1.9833 2.8145 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 2.2206
46 1.6040 0 . 0 0 0 0 2.5172 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.2123 3.9203
47 0 . 0 0 0 0 1.6341 3.4613 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 7.4888
48 1.9766 2.5903 6.3044 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.2316 3.4033
49 1.2961 2.2441 3.4516 0.5059 1.1030 8.4370
50 0.9819 2.3936 3.5577 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 1.4156
51 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 1.0916 2.7907
52 1.7353 0 . 0 0 0 0 4.5315 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.2181 0 . 0 0 0 0
53 1.4262 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 1.3523
54 1.5236 2.6035 3.5323 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 6.9077
55 1.8867 2.4073 2.7749 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.9501 2.2815
56 0.9990 0 . 0 0 0 0 4.1551 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.1917 1.6590
57 1.0060 0 . 0 0 0 0 3.9052 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.1355 0.9681
58 1.3331 0 . 0 0 0 0 5.9165 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.0797
59 1.5174 2.6725 3.1617 0.7204 1.7848 2.5466
60 1.4111 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.0872 3.5360
61 2.0758 0 . 0 0 0 0 2.6437 0.8229 0.3491 5.3454
62 1.6947 2.8245 3.6954 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 3.8251
63 1.7642 3.2531 3.5190 0.5230 0.2095 1.5233
64 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.2643 0 . 0 0 0 0
65 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.4164 2.1318
66 1.9952 2.1885 4.7588 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 1.2805
67 1.0389 2.5044 5.7969 1.1401 0.2801 4.2106
68 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 3.6435
69 1.0879 2.8061 2.7571 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 1.4282
70 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 3.5898
71 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.8996 0 . 0 0 0 0
72 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.1164 0 . 0 0 0 0

















74 1.8403 4.4907 3.9383 0.8074 0.0000 0.0000
75 1.2592 2.2364 4.0814 0.0000 0.0000 5.2951
76 1.3884 0.0000 3.9306 0.0000 0.0000 4.9801
77 1.6800 3.3112 2.7753 0.5167 0.2280 0.6368
78 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 3.9406
79 1.0310 2.8993 3.8513 0.0000 0.4571 0.5278
80 1.7547 1.9562 2 . 5274 0.0000 0.0000 2.3807
81 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.9569 0.0000
82 1.6904 1.4919 4.3740 0.0000 0.0000 1.8733
83 1.2885 3.1140 3.7293 0.5059 0.3622 0.7324
84 0.0000 2.3778 2.9245 0.9360 0.4827 0.0000
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Table B.4 'Commodity P-r-iees—P_aid by Electric Utilities
W-sale Retail Total
Data Sales Sales Sales
No. (MW Hours) (MW Hours) (MW Hours)
1 2,760,294 0 2 760 294
2 4,718,470 20,468,067 26 856 275
3 1,372,139 13,397,463 14 769 602
4 0 22,974,965 22 974 965
5 12,049 1,466,358 1 498 546
6 0 1,212,031 1 212 031
7 0 1,140,028 1 233 385
8 4,077,966 0 4 077 966
9 531,431 4,354,903 4 886 334
10 0 4,575,996 4 610 116
11 363,430 13,045,381 14 028 160
12 2,539,920 14,790,191 17 559 785
13 29,159 66,389,046 67 489 622
14 1,935,582 0 1 935 582
15 0 3,071,490 3 071 490
16 2,536,872 0 2 536 872
17 2,015,999 31,607,920 33 623 919
18 243 892,086 892 329
19 0 27,633,834 28 489 858
20 1, 114,581 54,769,631 64 671 060
21 13,300 409,701 548 587
22 376,680 3,992,310 5 079 754
23 0 55,647,258 56 591 527
24 179,162 1,500,012 2 081 288
25 691,168 53,439,741 55 911 327
26 1,717,389 10,175,313 11 977 483
27 0 10,574,471 0
28 0 10,574,471 10 595 159
29 9,971,697 0 9 971 697
30 53,607 4,105,681 4 418 005
31 573 330,004 330 577
32 0 15,260,758 15 550 652
33 542,567 5,165,589 5 741 322
34 238,940 15,095,105 15 336 187
35 52,313 8,674,345 8 726 658
36 22,288 2,068,231 2 090 519





Data Sales Sales Sales
No. (MW Hours) (MW Hours) (MW Hours)
38 0 625 698 625 698
39 361 8,760 272 8,931 379
40 538,016 6,802 416 8,834 750
41 966,351 8,216 929 9, 183 280
42 1,142,382 6,272 752 8,674 683
43 4,171,026 0 4,697 963
44 371 4,167 837 4,168 208
45 0 7,346 668 7,390 848
46 19,681,382 13 792 20,093 255
47 308,942 5,055 352 5,364 294
48 0 11,641 647 11,797 562
49 2,411,489 23,639 338 26,970 889
50 4,945 804 234 811 179
51 0 99 696 104 177
52 4,420,323 26,517 439 31,555 831
53 5,687,323 11,841 780 17,529 103
54 161,594 17,163 768 18,471 120
55 1,623,166 2,496 875 4,120 041
56 451,578 2,550 915 3, 140 117
57 5,119,557 20,958 207 26,086 331
58 719,022 3,345 933 4,190 973
59 0 29,990 465 30,497 628
60 4,468,456 9,296 911 14,246 625
61 511,513 5,342 526 6,952 547
62 0 11,558 010 12,085 469
63 1,047,654 5,948 762 6,996 416
64 0 945 637 945 637
65 9,538 144 025 153 563
66 862,259 11,746 024 14,910 544
67 1,439,074 63,469 291 65,514 481
68 101,989 791 416 893 917
69 0 1,180 977 1,180 977
70 59,000 468 200 528 200
71 0 0 1,577 112
72 0 1,595 293 1,595 293















74 0 7,561,933 7,906,076
75 0 5,486,249 6,377,468
76 0 726,461 726,463
77 643,059 27,521,297 29,006,167
78 0 2,301,852 2,341,701
79 2,606,733 18,053,378 21,180,013
80 559 3,098,116 3,255,736
81 0 0 0
82 418,752 3,915,079 5,661,534
83 607,726 18,112,278 20,134,824
84 9,576 3,602,115 3,625,152
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Table B.5 Data Set Average Values
Obs N Minimum Maximum Mean Std Dev
COAL C 0 3.0113000 1.0593812 0.8079289
GAS C 0 5.6299000 1.5734047 1.5151002
OIL C 0 14.3081000 2.9188541 2.2774266
U308 C 0 4.4496000 0.2443506 0.5608166
HYDRO C 0 2.1457000 0.2827788 0.4667305
WSALE C 0 24.0372000 3.2071365 3.6781337
COAL S 0 1.0000000 0.3533718 0.3429762
GAS S 0 0.6713000 0.0744976 0.1559566
OIL S 0 0.9545000 0.0777635 0.1770794
U308 S 0 1.0000000 0.0596059 0.1669480
HYDRO S 0 1.0000000 0.0555918 0.2121959
WSALE S 0 1.0000000 0.3791776 0.3361741
WSALE Q 0 19,681,382 1,201,946 2,655,647
RSALE Q 0 66,389,046 10,559,280 14,599,423
TOT Q 0 67,489,622 12,096,138 15,331,490












PRICE 1.56 2.73 3.94 0.80 0.29 3.84








Error SSE MSE Root MSE: R2 Adj R 2
Durbin
Watson
CS 11.5 70. 5 4.3876 0.06223 0.24947 0.5368 0.4679 1.866
GS 11.5 70.5 0.7766 0.01102 0.10496 0.6174 0.5604 2.485
OS 11.5 70.5 1.9120 0.02712 0.16468 0.2714 0.1628 1.987
US 11.5 70.5 1.6935 0.02402 0.15499 0.2754 0.1675 2.341
HS 11.5 70.5 2.2577 0.03202 0.17895 0.2150 0.0980 1.644
WS 11.5 70.5 4.4656 0.06334 0.25168 0.5092 0.4360 1.887






A1 -1.314562 0.39621 -3.32 0.0014
A2 -0.181650 0.17134 -1.06 0.2927
A3 0. 118211 0.26100 0.45 0.6520
A4 -0.236104 0.24289 -0.97 0.3344
A5 0.598967 0.26154 2.29 0.0250
A6 2.014929 0.36418 5.53 0.0001
Bll 0.023968 0.09432 0.25 0.8002
B12 0.029959 0.04447 0.67 0.5027
B13 -0.010152 0.05264 -0.19 0.8476
B14 0.067273 0.05526 1.22 0.2275
B15 0.010633 0.02772 0.38 0.7024
B16 -0.121670 0.03178 -3.83 0.0003





Parameter Estimate Std Err Ratio Prob>|T!
B22 -0.069317 0.04036 -1.72 0.0903
B23 -0.00346897 0.03144 -0.11 0.9125
B24 0.032381 0.03282 0.99 0.3273
B25 0.010581 0.01233 0.86 0.3939
B26 -0.00012274 0.01391 -0.01 0.9930
B27 0.022187 0.0098723 2.25 0.0278
B33 -0.097738 0.05270 -1.85 0.0679
B34 0.085010 0.04069 2.09 0.0403
B35 0.026414 0.01812 1.46 0.1494
B36 -0.00004096 0.02129 -0.00 0.9985
B37 0.013704 0.01508 0.91 0.3666
B44 -0.150285 0.05698 -2.64 0.0103
B45 0.013209 0.01770 0.75 0.4579
B46 -0.047574 0.02030 -2.34 0.0220
B47 0.00845341 0.01447 0.58 0.5611
B55 -0.036275 0.02084 -1.74 0.0861
B56 -0.024569 0.01888 -1.30 0.1975
B57 -0.042083 0.01591 -2.65 0.0101
B66 0.193979 0.03326 5.83 0.0001
B67 -0.109762 0.02195 -5.00 0.0001
Rll -0.140734 0.13253 -1.06 0.2919
R12 0.111283 0.16266 0.68 0.4961
R13 0.212500 0.12551 1.69 0.0949
R14 0.242442 0.13415 1.81 0.0750
R15 -0.043384 0.14483 -0.30 0.7654
R16 0.233282 0.16284 1.43 0.1564
R21 0.00605879 0.05677 0.11 0.9153
R22 -0.072970 0.06943 -1.05 0.2969
R23 -0.054264 0.05355 -1.01 0.3144
R24 -0.045018 0.05733 -0.79 0.4350
R25 0.267678 0.06474 4.13 0.0001











R31 0.055295 0.08772 0.63 0.5305
R32 -0.096260 0.10768 -0.89 0.3744
R33 -0.125350 0.08274 -1.51 0.1343
R34 -0.135019 0.08879 -1. 52 0.1329
R35 -0.130134 0.09602 -1.36 0.1797
R36 -0.116225 0.10893 -1 .07 0.2897
R41 0.113554 0.08421 1.35 0.1818
R42 -0.00300080 0.10366 -0.03 0.9770
R43 -0.058806 0.07975 -0.74 0.4634
R44 -0.017175 0.08577 -0.20 0.8419
R45 -0.012899 0.09159 -0.14 0.8884
R46 -0.030262 0.10197 -0.30 0.7675
R51 0.015963 0.09152 0.17 0.8620
R52 0.027664 0.11524 0.24 0.8110
R53 0.124661 0.08845 1.41 0.1632
R54 -0.019691 0.09486 -0.21 0.8362
R55 0.049129 0.10166 0.48 0.6304
R56 0.081940 0.11455 0.72 0.4768
R61 -0.050106 0.12884 -0.39 0.6985
R62 0.033288 0.16217 0.21 0.8380
R63 -0.098710 0.12432 -0.79 0.4299
R64 -0.025494 0.13313 -0.19 0.8487
R65 -0.130359 0.14175 -0.92 0.3609
R66 -0.083218 0.16130 -0.52 0.6075
